HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



13 



army, amounting to 12,000 men, 

 had murdered their commander, 

 and taken post at the bridge of 

 Almaraz. They stated also, that 

 the whole French army in Spain> 

 did not exceed 70 or 80,000, and 

 denied that any reinforcements 

 were on their way. A part of this 

 army, they said, was employed be- 

 fore Saragossa. 



This representation of affairs (it 

 is observed by Mr. Moore) is a 

 just exemplification of the manner 

 in which the Spanish Junta en- 

 deavoured to cover their cala- 

 mities from the sight of their al- 

 lies. Not being able absolutely to 

 deny the capitulation, they sof- 

 tened it into a kind of agreement ; 

 adding, that the indignant inhabi- 

 tants had refused to deliver up 

 their arms, and that the French 

 had not ventured to enter the city. 

 They also sunk down the numbers 

 of Buonaparte's army far below 

 the truth, and exaggerated those 

 of their own in the same propor- 

 tion ; completely disguising from 

 the British general the relative 

 strength of both. They seem to 

 have placed unbounded confidence 

 in the sole efforts of the British 

 army, and to think the cause of 

 Spain secure, at least not despe- 

 rate, so long as it remained in the 

 country. But they were afraid 

 lest this army, if the real state of 

 affairs should be known, would 

 abandon them to themselves. It 

 was also a part of their policy to 

 rouse the spirit with the hopes of 

 one province, by false or greatly 

 exaggerated accounts of the en- 

 thusiasm and the exertions of ano- 

 ther. This hollow, and really 

 puerile policy, was utterly incom- 

 patible with the liberty of the 

 press, and for this and other rea- 



sons equally unjustifiable, it was 

 one of their first acts to suppress 



it- 

 Sir John Moore neilhrr wholly 

 crediting, nor wholly disbelieving 

 the statement made by the mem- 

 bers of the Junta, whom Colonel 

 Graham had found at Salamanca, 

 while it afforded him but small 

 grounds for cherishing his opinion, 

 as to the final issue of the contest, 

 was not of a nature to induce him 

 wholly to discontinue, or even to 

 relax his efforts. On the one 

 hand, Madrid, after so much boast- 

 ing and bustle, had made little or 

 no resistance : suspicions of trea- 

 chery were general in the armies, 

 and among the people. These 

 suspicions the armies seemed but 

 too willing to use as a cloak for 

 their own cowardice : repeated de- 

 feats had proved the defects of 

 their soldiers ; repeated mis-infor- 

 mation, the ignorance or the trea- 

 chery of the Spanish government. 

 Yet, on the other hand, the people 

 of Madrid (as.Sir J. M. was taught 

 to suppose) were still in arms; 

 part of the French force was enga- 

 ged in their reduction ; part was 

 occupied before Saragossa. A 

 diversion might cover these two 

 places, threaten the enemy's com- 

 munications, give time to the scat- 

 tered armies to re-assemble, and. 

 to the provinces of the South, to 

 put forth in the common cause 

 their best energies. At any rate 

 a movement towards Valladolid 

 and Baynos would cover Sir Da- 

 vid Baird while assembling at As- 

 torga and Eenevento ; and the 

 British army would be as safe at 

 Zamora as Salamanca. By these 

 considerations Sir John Moore 

 was determined: when an inter- 

 cepted dispatch from Marshal Ber- 



thier 



