16 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



the generals Blake and Castanos, 

 did the soldiers display, to use an 

 expression of Sir John Moore's, 

 common obstinacy. They fled on 

 the first fire, and then claimed me- 

 rit for having effected their escape. 



It ought to be observed, in fa- 

 vour, though it is not a complete 

 defence of the Spanish generals 

 who so imprudently hazarded these 

 engagements, that they had cauti- 

 ously abstained from risking any 

 offensive operations against the 

 French, till they were propelled by 

 the treachery of Morla. They 

 have been repeatedly blamed by 

 the ignorant for their inactivity 

 during the autumn : whereas their 

 greatest praise is, to have been sen- 

 sible of their own weakness and in- 

 feriority, and to have shaped for 

 themselves a course of conduct suit- 

 able to their circumstances. They 

 were justified by the event. By 

 the ruin of the armies under 

 Blake, Castanos, and the young 

 Count Belvedere, the road was 

 cleared, and Buonaparte moved 

 from Burgos upon the capital. 



The several divisions of the 

 French army were every where in 

 pursuit of the flying Spaniards, 

 when Buonaparte received inform- 

 ation that the British army had 

 not retreated upon Portugal, as he 

 supposed (judging no doubt from 

 what would have been his own con- 

 duct in Sir John Moore's situation), 

 but was threatening the Duke of 

 Dalmatia's position behind the 

 Carrion. The advance of the 

 French into the southern pro- 

 vinces of Spain was suspended. 



Orders were immediately sent to 

 the Duke of Dalmatia if attacked, 

 to give way, and to decoy the Bri- 

 tish to Burgos, or as far eastward 

 as possible ; and at the same time 



to push on a corps towards Leon» 

 on their left flank. And, should 

 they attempt to retreat, he was 

 ordered to impede this by every 

 means in his power. But from the 

 22d to the 29th of Dec, SouJt re- 

 ceived strong re-inforcements : so 

 that his army alone was much su- 

 perior to the British. It was post- 

 ed behind the River Carrion, be- 

 tween Carrion and Saldannah. Ju- 

 not, the Duke of Abrantes, who had 

 advanced from Burgos toPlacentia, 

 threatened the right flank of the 

 British. The corps under Le Fe- 

 vre, Duke of Dantzick, which had 

 advanced to Talavera de la Reyna 

 in its way to Badajoz, was directed 

 to march backward on Salamanca. 

 Buonaparte himself, in person, on 

 the 18th of Dec, marched from 

 Madrid with an army consisting 

 of 32,000 infantry and 8,000 ca- 

 valry: even the division under Mor- 

 tier, called the Duke of Treviso, 

 which was on its march to Sara- 

 gossa, was stopped. In a word, 

 the whole disposable force of the 

 French army, forming an irregular 

 crescent, was marching in radii to 

 environ the British. To accom- 

 plish this favourite object, Buona- 

 parte interrupted his victorious ca- 

 reer to the south, where there was 

 nothing capable of resisting him. 

 Lisbon and Cadiz, at that time, 

 would have yielded as easily as 

 Madrid. The bold measures that 

 had been adopted by Sir John 

 Moore, prevented the immediate 

 subjugation of the peninsula. It 

 remains to be seen, what was the 

 plan he adopted for the extrication 

 of his own army from its present 

 most perilous situation. 



The advanced guard of the 

 French cavalry that Buonaparte 

 had brought from Madrid, passed 



through 



