30 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



out that spirit amongst themselves 

 no army that we could send would 

 be of any avail. They adopted a 

 system, which was published in the 

 early part of the summer, under 

 the title of " Precautions," and 

 which contained a most excellent 

 plan of defence adapted to the pe- 

 culiarities of the country, and cal- 

 culated to harass and annoy an in- 

 vading army, and to wear them 

 down by a continued system of 

 partial attack, without incurring 

 the risk which must necessarily at- 

 tend a pitched battle with regular 

 and veteran troops. This system 

 was the best which could be adopted 

 by that country, under its then cir- 

 cumstances, and might have pro- 

 duced a great effect upon the ene- 

 my, whose troops would have been 

 continually harassed and fatigued, 

 whilst the Spaniards, taking advan- 

 tage of the peculiarities of their 

 countr)% would have incurred lit- 

 tle immediate risk, and would have 

 gained a knowledge and attained a 

 discipline which might have sub- 

 sequently qualified them to con- 

 tend in the field with the regular 

 troops of France. This excellent 

 system we forced them to abandon, 

 by sending into the interior of the 

 country a British army; it then be- 

 came impossible for the Spaniards 

 to leave our army to fight their bat- 

 tles by itself; our army would, of 

 course, proceed in the manner and 

 according to the usual routine of a 

 regular army ; and thus the Spani- 

 ards were forced on to engage in 

 pitched battles, at a period when 

 they were not competent, with re- 

 gular troops, wliilst the British 

 army, too small to cope with the 

 great superiority of troops brought 

 into the field by France, can only 

 retreat. In this way, my lords, I 



contend that the sending a British 

 army into the interior of Spain has 

 been actually injurious to the cause 

 of the patriots in that country. 



In what manner have they af- 

 forded the aid of which they now 

 so much boast ? Setting aside for 

 a moment the consideration of the 

 general question of the policy or 

 impolicy of sending British troops 

 into the interior of Spain, it may 

 be said, that there was a time when 

 a British force of 30 or 40.000 

 men might have contributed to ob- 

 tain a great temporary advantage, 

 which, whatever effect it migiit 

 have had upon the ultimate fate of 

 the war, would at least have ena- 

 bled the Spaniards to arrange their 

 defence, and to mature their pre- 

 parations. It may be said that 

 there was a period of the contest 

 when the French having been 

 driven from Madrid, and forced to 

 take I'efuge in the neighbourhood 

 of the Pyrenees, a British force 

 sent there at that particular crisis, 

 might have driven the F"rench be- 

 yond the Pyrenees, and placed 

 in the hands of the Spaniards the 

 keys of their country, which they 

 might then have been enabled to 

 defend under infinitely more ad- 

 vantageous circumstances than they 

 had since been placed in. It might 

 be said that this case did, from 

 peculiar circumstances, actually 

 occur. Allowing it to be so, how 

 was it taken advantage of? One 

 might have supposed, that, to make 

 the proper use of such an advan- 

 tageous conjuncture of affairs, our 

 troops would have been sent to tlie 

 port nearest the scene of action, 

 and from whence they might be 

 marched, in the shortest time, to 

 the spot where their services were 

 most wanted. Bnt, instead of the 



nearest 



