HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



31 



nearest port, the farthest Beemeil 

 to have been chosen, and the 

 troops were sent to Lisbon. They 

 are there employed in compelling 

 the French to evacuate Portugal, 

 who could not have held it if Buo- 

 naparte could not conquer Spain, 

 and who must get possession of it 

 if he does ; and afterwards remain 

 there for two months before they 

 inarch to join the Spaniards. The 

 moment was urgent, the occasion 

 was pressing, every thing depend- 

 ed upon promptitude of action, 

 and taking advantage of a small 

 portion of time; and yet two 

 months pass away before the army 

 is even put in march to join the 

 Spanish troops ; and the general 

 who commanded in chief, in giving 

 an account of his conduct, says, 

 that no arrangement was determin- 

 ed upon for putting the army in 

 march. The transports which 

 ought to have conveyed our troops 

 are used to convey the troops of 

 the enemy ; and our army, com- 

 pelled to make a long march over 

 land, are too late for any effective 

 purpose, and the enemy triumphs 

 in the capital of Spain before even 

 a British musket is fired. The Spa- 

 nish people may truly reproach us, 

 " You promised us protection and 

 assistance ; you induced us to en- 

 gage in the dangerous warfare of 

 pitched battles, quitting our more 

 desultory mode of warfare, but 

 more secure to ourselves and more 

 harassing to the enemy ; and now 

 the oppressor lords it in our capi- 

 tal, plunders our property, and puts 

 to death our nobles, whilst not a 

 single British musket has yet been 

 fired." Most unfortunate is it that 

 our army should be placed in such 

 a situation which must necessarily 

 give rise to apprehension. The di- 



lemma stated by my noble friend 

 (Lord Sidmouth), most aptly ap- 

 plies to ministers upon this subject: 

 either they did or they did not 

 know that a British army, sent into 

 the interior of Spain, would have 

 to encounter the whole disposable 

 force of France. Iftheydidknowit, 

 by what infatuation could they have 

 been induced to place an army in a 

 situation in which no rational men 

 would ever have thought of placing 

 it? Iftheydidnotknow it, then they 

 must confess that they were wholly 

 ignorant of the resources of France 

 — that they were wholly ignorant 

 that the ruler of France had the 

 resources of the greater part of Eu- 

 rope at his command — that they 

 were wholly ignorant that France 

 had a large army which could be 

 brought to bear upon any given 

 point. With this view of the sub- 

 ject, it is, of course, impossible 

 that I can concur in applauding 

 the past measures adopted by mi- 

 nisters with respect to Spain ; nor 

 can I concur in supporting the sys- 

 tem proposed to be adopted for in- 

 creasing the army, with the view 

 of sending more troops to Spain, 

 for this must be the object, or the 

 expression means nothing; al- 

 though I do not mean to deny, 

 that with the evils with which we 

 are now surrounded, the increase 

 of our regular force is a necessary 

 measure. From the approbation, 

 however, which is implied of their 

 conduct, and their wise and vigor- 

 ous system, I must decidedly dis- 

 sent, contending, as I do, that there 

 has been neither wisdom nor vi- 

 gour in their measures. 



Lord Grenville said, that there 

 was one most important topic which 

 he thought it his duty to press on 

 the attention of their lordships, 



though 



