4IIST0RY OF EUROPE. 



45 



thcr it expressed the general sen- 

 timents of the nation. Certainly, 

 early in the war the Spanish troops 

 were local and irregular ; but this 

 force was soon found to be ineffec- 

 tive. Even in Andalusia, a regu- 

 lar army had been established, and 

 it was not till they were in posses- 

 sion of a regular army, that the 

 Spaniards were enabled to make 

 an effectual struggle, and to re- 

 duce the power of the enemy by 

 the defeat of Dupont at the nie- 

 morabie battle of Baylen. The 

 course of events decided the ques- 

 tion between a regular and an ir- 

 regular force. When Madrid was 

 evacuated, and the provinces purg- 

 ed of the French, every province 

 felt the necessity of advancing its 

 troops, and they had consequently 

 been advanced and consolidated 

 in the center of the kingdom. — 

 His majesty's ministers had, there- 

 fore, no option — the option had 

 been made by Spain. They had 

 chosen the mode of regular war- 

 fare, and it would have ill-befitted 

 the character of Great Britain to 

 have shrunk from the contest, and 

 to have said to the Spaniards : 

 " We will give you money, we will 

 give you stores, but we will not 

 hazard our blood in your defence." 

 The speech of the right honour- 



able gentleman was rather Sf a 

 prudent cast, and not in that ani- 

 mated style, in which another 

 right honourable gentleman (Mr. 

 Sheridan) had, in the last session, 

 represented the aiding Spain as 

 paramount to all other duties. The 

 right honourable gentlemen who 

 spoke this night, seemed to think 

 it was very improper and impru- 

 dent for a British army to enter 

 Spain, without having some cau- 

 tionary towns and forts surrender- 

 ed to us, to secure our retreat in 

 case of calamitj'. Mr. C. for his 

 part, knew of no town of that 

 sort which could be surrendered, 

 except Cadiz ; for as to Ferrol, it 

 was not a town capable of answer- 

 ing the object proposed, nor of 

 protecting the embaikation of an 

 army. Now, as it was evident, 

 that if we were to make any ope- 

 rations at all, they must be in the 

 north of Spain, he could not con- 

 ceive that a proposal would be well 

 received in that country, for sur- 

 rendering a town quite without 

 the line of our military operations. 

 If we had made such a proposal 

 to that generous and high-spirited 

 nation, he could not suppose that 

 we could have thrown a greater 

 apple of discord to disturb the 

 harmony of cordial co-operation. 



As 



truth in stating, that it hail no kind of authorit}'. It was drawn up, authenticated 

 and circulated throughout all Spain, by the Junta of Seville, which, at first, ac- 

 cording to ancient usage, took the lead in the great affairs of the nation., and to 

 which, for some time, the other Juntas paid m-eat respect and deference, acqui- 

 escing in its measures, as if it had been indeed the Supreme Central Junta. General 

 Castanos, the commander of the troops of Andalusia, chosen by and under the di- 

 rection of the Junta of Seville, acted on the system recommended in the Precau- 

 tions, before the establishment of the Central Junta. On the 21st of November, 

 1808, when the advanced guard of the French appeared in sight, he retreated from 

 Cintruenigo to Tudela. and wished to have continued his retreat ; but was unfor- 

 tunately overruled by the representatives of the Supreme Junta, and the Captain- 

 General of Arragon. 



See the Paper entitled Precautions, duly authenticated, in our volume for 1808. 

 State Papers, p. 333. 



