46 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



As to another disposition of the 

 forces which had been mentioned, 

 that of sending Sir Arthur Welles- 

 ley's force of 9,000 men to the Py- 

 renees, to cut off the communica- 

 tion between the 60,000 French 

 troops who were in Spain, and the 

 rest of the 500,000 disposable 

 troops, of which the right honour- 

 able gentleman stated the enemy's 

 army to consist, the bare state- 

 ment of such a plan must convince 

 the house of its absurdity. With 

 regard to the idea which had been 

 thrown out, of the propriety of 

 directing our forces to Spain in the 

 first instance, instead of Portugal, 

 he must say, there never was a 

 fallacy more absurd than the idea 

 of occupying the passes of the 

 Pyrenees, and cutting off entirely 

 the communication between two 

 armies infinitely superior. This 

 fallacy seemed to arise from the 

 idea that an army, when once 

 landed, could put itself on march 

 the next morning, to attack the 

 enemy. There were some persons 

 who appeared to think, that an 

 army once landed could act as 

 speedily as a ship when it has left 

 the port. The ditterence, how- 

 ever, was very great : the ship 

 had nothing to do but to go with 

 the wind, and meet the enemy ; 

 whereas an army when landed had 

 much difficulty in collecting pro- 

 visions, and the means of trans- 

 porting their necessary baggage. 

 If the present administration were, 

 however, to have waited till every 

 thing was ready for the reception 

 of our armies, they must have 

 stood as still as the last vigorous 

 administration, who actually did 

 nothing while in office. — He would 

 venture to say, from the me- 



lancholy experience of the falcf 

 of General Blake's army, that 

 if a British army had landed at 

 St. Andero, and scrambled as far 

 as General Blake advanced, none 

 of them would ever have come 

 back. He was convinced that 

 there was not a single military man 

 who would support the idea of a 

 campaign in the P3'renees, for a 

 British army. The right honour- 

 able gentleman had stated, that 

 the expedition which had achieved 

 the deliveiance of Portugal had 

 been sent to sea, to seek its for- 

 tunes, without any particular di- 

 rection from government. The 

 fact however, was directly the 

 reverse, because, most unques- 

 tionably, the expedition under Sir 

 Arthur Wellesley did sail with a 

 most precise and determinate ob- 

 ject. It had been ordered to go 

 immediately to the Tagus, without 

 stopping at Corunna. This direc- 

 tion was given in consequence of 

 precise information from Sir C. 

 Cotton (which, however, after- 

 wards turned out to be unfounded), 

 that there were no more than 

 5,000 French troops in Lisbon and 

 the other forts upon the Tagus, 

 and that Sir Arthur Wellesley 's 

 expedition would be sufficient to 

 dislodge them. The expedition 

 then had been sent out with a pre- 

 cise object, and with precise in- 

 structions, but it would hardly be 

 contended, that government should 

 have tied up the hands and the 

 discretion of such a meritorious 

 officer as Sir Arthur W^ellesley so 

 completely as to say, that he must 

 on no occasion take advantage of 

 any favourable circumstances 

 which might occur in the varying 

 and fleeting fortune of the war, 



without 



