HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



59 



a!i events, have amounted only to 

 25,000 men; a force totally in- 

 competent to seize on the Pyren- 

 nees, through which, instead of 

 one pass, there were forty-three ; 

 and where instead of an army 

 of 25,000 men, we should have 

 had to contend with a French force 

 of 100,000 men in Spain, and 

 according to the calculation of 

 Mr. P. upwards of 400,000 men 

 in France. Then, if the measure 

 itself was not unwise, the next 

 question was, if there was any 

 thing in the equipment wanting. 

 In calling their attention to the 

 principle of equipment. Lord C. 

 wished the house to distinguish 

 between an army landing in a 

 country, and an army proceeding 

 on its march, after having landed ; 

 and stated that an advancing army 

 in general depended on the coun- 

 try which it went to succour, for 

 supplies. In the present case, 

 there had been a dependence only 

 for the means of carriage. When 

 a want of artillery horses was com- 

 plained of. Lord Petty must have 

 willingly shut his eyes to the re- 

 inforcement which was immediate- 

 ly to follow from England ; and 

 which made all the artillery horses 

 to amount to 778. If Sir Arthur 

 Wellesley's means had been more 

 liberal, there was no doubt but his 

 services would have been more 

 brilliant ; but at the same time 

 there could hardly be a question, 

 tliat he would not have advanced, 

 if he did not think his means suf- 

 ficient for occupying the city of 

 Lisbon, and the forts of the Ta- 

 gus ; Sir H. Burrard also knew 

 that Sir J. Moore's army had ar- 

 rived, and that he might expect 

 the equipment of artillery horses, 

 &c. which belonged to it. It was, 



however, a question, whether an 

 army was useless without horses at 

 all. In Egypt we had only about 

 150. The same was the case when 

 Sir Ralph Abercrombie was in Hol- 

 land. Lord Petty had expressed 

 his surprise, that no instructions 

 had been given to Admiral Cotton, 

 except those of the 18th of April. 

 Those instructions, he stated, 

 were given without any view to 

 the subsequent circumstances: — 

 they related merely to a case of 

 starvation, which was in view at 

 that time. The noble lord had 

 found fault with the general terms 

 of instructions to officers. He did 

 not, however, agree with him in 

 thinking, that there was any thing 

 improper in giving discretion- 

 ary power. As to the rapid suc- 

 cession of generalissimos, it was 

 hardly possible that in any exten- 

 sive military operations, the chief 

 command should not change hands. 

 In the Low Countries, it had hap- 

 pened, that on one occasion no 

 fewer than four such changes had 

 taken place within the period of 

 forty-eight hours. On the whole, 

 Lord C. contended that the expe- 

 dition against the French in Por- 

 tugal was a most wise and expedi- 

 ent measure ; and that the various 

 plans of operations suggested as 

 preferable, were, in some cases, 

 visionary, and in all would have 

 been dangerous; that the object 

 of the expedition was the best 

 that could have been adopted; and 

 the equipment the most perfect 

 that circumstances would permit ; 

 that the execution was as com- 

 plete as the nature of the case 

 would allow ; and that there was 

 no failure, except what resulted 

 from causes which neitlier the ad- 

 ministration, nor the officers, could 



control 



