HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



61 



ency of his own force to execute 

 his object, that he did not intend 

 to have employed the corps under 

 General Ackland in the field at 

 all, but in the siege of Peniche. 

 And, as to Sir J. Moore, it was his 

 plan to send him forward to San- 

 tarem, with a view to intercept 

 the enemy, who, in Sir Arthur's 

 opinion, would endeavour to cross 

 the Tagus. That plan was feasi- 

 ble, not onlj' in his opinion, but 

 in that of all the general officers 

 who had given evidence at the 

 Court of Inquiry, and even of 

 the Court itself. With respect to 

 the change of commanders, when 

 he left England, he never expect- 

 ed to be continued in the com- 

 mand after large re-inforcements 

 had arrived. But at the same time 

 he did not think that the command 

 should be changed in the middle of 

 expeditions. In the course of the 

 campaign, the command might be 

 changed without injury. But 

 those expeditions were not cam- 

 paigns. They were only opera- 

 tions. But as, by the change of 

 the commanders, the whole sys- 

 tem had been altered, this cir- 

 cumstance necessarily governed 

 him in his subsequent views. His 

 original plan was, to have engag- 

 ed the enemy as near to Lisbon 

 as possible, and to have followed 

 up the advantage which he un- 

 doubtedly expected, with the ut- 

 most expedition ; by which means 

 he trusted, he would have got to 

 Lisbon nearly as soon as them- 

 selves, and prevented their cross- 

 ing the Tagus. He never could 

 understand how the court of In- 

 quiry, which had approved of all 



that he had done up to the close 

 of the battle of Vimiera, could 

 have said that those troops which 

 had been constantly beaten in the 

 field, ought not to be pursued 

 when beaten. But the Board of 

 Inquiry said, " The very circum- 

 stance of a superior cavalry re- 

 tarding our advance, would allow 

 the enemy's infantry to continue 

 their retreat in the most rapid 

 manner, till they should arrive at 

 any given rallying point, advanta- 

 geous for formation and making a 

 stand. Nor did Sir A. Wellesley, 

 on the 17th of August, when the 

 enemy had not half the cavalry as 

 on the 21st, pursue a more consi- 

 derable and beaten enemy with 

 any marked advantage, for he 

 says, " the enemy retired with the 

 utmost regularity, and the great- 

 est celerity ; and notwithstanding 

 the rapid advance of the British 

 inftmtry, the want of a sufficient 

 body of cavalry was the cause of 

 his suffering but little loss in the 

 plain.''* The fact. Sir A. Wel- 

 lesley said, was, that there were 

 two parts of the action of the 1 7th ; 

 the one in the mountains, and the 

 other in the plains. In that part 

 of ihe action which took place in 

 the plain, the enemy had retreated 

 in good order. After the battle 

 of the 21st, they had retreated in 

 great disorder. And the good or- 

 der of the retreat in one instance 

 made all the difference. If the 

 enemy had been vigorously follow- 

 ed up on the 21st, he was satisfied 

 in his own mind, that there would 

 have been no reason for conclud- 

 ing the Convention which had 

 given so much offence. 



Now, 



• See Report of the Board of Inquiry, Vol. L. (1808) Appendix to the Chro- 

 nicle, J). 273. 



