62 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



Now, as to this convention, it 

 was ratlier hard to charge it upon 

 the government, when, if a certain 

 plan of operations had been fol- 

 lowed up, the reason for it would 

 not have existed. — The necessity 

 for concluding the convention had 

 been ascribed to the want of ar- 

 tillery ; of horses ; of equipment 

 of various kinds. But he vvas 

 bound to state, that in considering 

 the propriety of concluding an 

 armistice, and afterwards the con- 

 vention, these circumstances had 

 never been taken into the account 

 by him, nor by any of the officers 

 concerned in the negociations on 

 that subject. Here it was proper to 

 consider the situation of the two 

 armies at the time when the ar- 

 mistice was concluded. The 

 French, after the battle of Vimie- 

 ra, had occupied a strong position, 

 in which they would have been 

 enabled to stop the progmss of a 

 superior force for three or four 

 days. The advancing army, after 

 being occupied for three or four 

 ilays in dislodging them from that 

 position, would have had further 

 to drive them from two or three 

 other lines which lay between the 

 main position and Lisbon. Dur- 

 ing the whole of this time, the 

 French might have been employed 

 in preparations for the passage of 

 the Tagus, v.hich it would have 

 been impossible to prevent. — But 

 it had been said, that Junot would 

 have been obliged to surrender at 

 last. This was true. But, at 

 what time of the year ? After our 

 array should have got possession of 

 the forts on the Vagus, it would 

 have been necessary to put it in a 

 situation of equipment for reduc- 

 ing the fort of Elvas by a regular 

 siege ; which reduction could not 



have been accomplished till the 

 beginning of December, and then 

 it might have been thought ad- 

 visable to give the French army 

 the same, or nearly the same terms 

 as those which were granted them 

 in August. Therefore he did not 

 think it disgraceful to allow the 

 French to embark. He thought 

 the gaining of time also an im- 

 portant object, with a view to the 

 operations in Spain. A British 

 army there might be of the great- 

 est consequence, in order to give 

 the Spaniards strength in their 

 own union, and to prevent their 

 being cut off in detail. — He had 

 done every thing in his power 

 to forward the objects of his su- 

 perior officers, though he differed 

 from them in opinion. This was 

 what he considered to be the 

 greatest distinction between mili- 

 tary and civil inferior situations. If, 

 in a civil office, the inferior differed 

 materially from the superior, lie 

 ought to resign. But, in military 

 appointment, it was the duty of 

 the inferior officer to assist the 

 commander in the mode in which 

 that commander might deem his 

 services most advantageous. 



Mr. Windham said, that the 

 statement of the honourable gene- 

 ral, though proper for him to 

 make, and satisfactory for his jus- 

 tification, was no justification of 

 his majesty's ministers. He ad- 

 mitted that the convention was a 

 measure of which they stood per- 

 fectly clear. But, when he allow- 

 ed this, he did not mean that there 

 was not matter of responsibility 

 in their preceding conduct; that 

 they were not responsible for the 

 manner in which they superseded 

 the commanding officers.— It had 

 been argued in defence of the con- 

 vention, 



