HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



63 



vention, lint it had the efFcct of 

 getting the French out of Portu- 

 gal sooner than could have been 

 done otherwise. In the first place 

 it was not true. The speediest way 

 would have been to have conquer- 

 ed them in the first instance, as 

 the honourable general would 

 have done with the troops he had, 

 and as the other generals do 

 not deny that they would have 

 done with a sufficiency of cavalry. 

 2dly, The expulsion of the enemy, 

 by subsequent operations, might 

 have been quite as speedy, and a 

 good deal more satisfactory, than 

 the method of convention. 3dly, 

 Of what advantage was it to go- 

 vernment to endeavour to acce- 

 lerate the evacuation, when as it 

 was, it came upon them before 

 they were prepared for it ? They 

 were embarrassed with their own 

 success, and not at all prepared 

 with what was to be the first step. 

 Three points, therefore, were es- 

 tablished against ministr)'. 1st, 

 That they were answerable for the 

 convention, good or bad as it 

 might be, in as much as it was by 

 changing the commanding officer, 

 and the want of means which they 

 ought to have provided, that it be- 

 came or was thought necessary. 

 2dly, That when they had got this 

 God-send, they were not at all 

 prepared to profit by it ; and that 

 therefore, 3dly, it the honour- 

 able general's success had been 

 completed in the way he had pro- 

 posed, they would still less have 

 been prepared, and made it still 

 more evident, that they had 

 sent the troops into Portugal in the 

 most head-long, blundering man- 

 ner, without the least idea of what 

 they were to do, or what plan was 

 to be pursued in dift'ereut results 



that might be supposed What 



advantage Mr. W. asked, could it 

 be to the c.nise of the Spaniards 

 to transport the French troops in 

 our ships to a port of France, from 

 which they would speedily march 

 into Spain ? — Lord Castlereagh 

 had stated, that it would have 

 been improper to have sent out a 

 large army under an inferior ge- 

 neral ; that a large force required, 

 as it were, a large general. But 

 surely it did not follow from that 

 position, that a small army ought 

 to be sent out with a small gene- 

 ral ? — Small he meant in rank, not 

 certainly in talents. Why not send 

 out in the first instance the proper 

 general with a small army, especi- 

 ally when that small army was im- 

 mediately to be increased to a large 

 one? It was from the neglect of 

 this principle that the rapid super- 

 cession of the generals, and all the 

 calamitous consequences of the 

 campaign had arisen. — It had been 

 declared to the house and the 

 country, from the highest autho- 

 rity in the state, that the conven- 

 tion of Cintra had disappointed 

 the hopes and expectations of the 

 nation. He wished to know whe- 

 ther ministers had changed their 

 mind ? did the}^ at the moment 

 when they fired the guns really 

 think the news was good ? or were 

 they only endeavouring, by noise 

 and clamour, by bold and confi- 

 dent show of exultation, by firings 

 at midnight, and puff's in the news- 

 papers in the morning, to confound 

 the sense of the country ? And, as 

 sometimes happens in other thea- 

 tres, to force as excellent, down the 

 throat of the public whatthey knew 

 in their own minds was execrable 

 stufl'. He should really be curious to 

 know in which way the honourable 



gentlemen 



