HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



69 



until the 27 th of November. 

 Ought not such a communication, 

 at least to have been kept up with 

 the executive body, as that the 

 general arriving with the force, 

 might know whether the Spani- 

 ards would relieve them or not ? 

 Without meaning to insinuate any 

 disparagement to Mr. Frere, he, 

 in Mr. P.'s humble opinion, was 

 not the proper person to be sent 

 to Spain. A military man was the 

 proper person to be sent to 

 that country. It was essentially 

 a military appointment, or it was 

 nothing. If the whole population 

 of the country was not disposed to 

 take up arms in its own defence, 

 and ready to be organized by the 

 government existing at the time in 

 order to act with us against France, 

 there was no chance of success in 

 Spain. Sir John Moore, on the 

 8th of November, reached Sala- 

 manca, and on the l-ith was fol- 

 lowed and joined there by most 

 part of his army. On the 5th of 

 November, Buonaparte arrived in 

 Spain, nine days before the British 

 army had reached Salamanca, and 

 placed himself at the head of that 

 army which had come from the 

 shores of the Danube and the Vis- 

 tula.— What were the views of the 

 English army, but to produce uni- 

 on and co-operation among the 

 Spaniards ? And was this to be 

 effected after the defeat and dis- 

 persion of the united army of Leon 

 and Estremadura, on the 10th of 

 November, and those of the army 

 under general Blake on the 11th?* 

 —In what situation did Sir David 

 Baird find himself on his land- 

 ing at Corunna in order to effect 



his junction with Sir John Moore? 

 He found nothing but a total ina- 

 bility to make a forward move- 

 ment. He had not even money 

 enough to defray the necessary 

 expenses of the army, or even to 

 obtain a supply of necessary pro- 

 visions ; but was obliged to have 

 recourse to the credit of private 

 individuals. From some causes hi- 

 therto unexplained, no British force 

 found its way into Spain, until all 

 the Spanish armies had been over- 

 thrown, and Madrid had a second 

 time capitulated to Buonaparte. 

 In this situation Sir John Moore 

 found himself in December. It 

 appeared that it had been the in- 

 tention of both Sir David Baird 

 and Sir John Moore, to retreat as 

 soon as they were informed of the 

 surrender of Madrid, and the de- 

 feat of Castanos. Orders were ac- 

 tually issued for that retreat, and 

 fortunate Mr. P. thought it would 

 have been had those orders been 

 persevered in, and the retreat com- 

 menced at that particular time, if 

 it could have been effected without 

 injury to those brave men who 

 commanded our army. The opi- 

 nion of the commander changed ; 

 and Mr. P. desired to know what 

 had produced the change ? Whj% 

 after the capitulation of Madrid, 

 and the advance of Buonaparte 

 as victor, the retreat was not 

 adopted ? Sir John Moore receiv- 

 ed dispatches from the supreme 

 Junta, and from Mr. Frfere, urg- 

 ing him to advance, rej)resenting 

 the great strength of the Spani- 

 ards in the South of Spain, and as- 

 suring him, that if he would attack 

 the enemy in the north, the Spa- 

 nish 



" Vide Vol. L. Hist. Euh. p. 232. 



