HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



71 



ijucible to the ignorance of the 

 right honourable mover. And 

 he did not think that that was, 

 or had ever been, pretended 

 to be a proper parhamentary 

 ground for inquiry. As he 

 could not bend to the cogency of 

 this reason, he certainly should 

 oppose the motion ; though, at 

 the same time, he declared that, 

 had there been the slightest prima 

 ^C2e evidence to support it, he would 

 have fully concurred in it. If the 

 result of the campaign in Spain 

 had not been as glorious as had 

 been so earnestly and justly ex- 

 pected, whether owing to the im- 

 perfect state of discipline of the 

 Spanish armies, or to the want of 

 sufficient time to complete that 

 discipline, still, he contended, that 

 there was no prima facie ground 

 for imputing the blame of that 

 failure to his majesty's ministers. 

 The British army was intended to 

 act only as an auxiliary force in 

 •aid of the Spanish armies ; and, 

 surely, the British government 

 was not to be blamed because the 

 Spanish forces, unhappily, had not 

 been able to hold out till the arri- 

 val of the military succours that 

 were sent out to their assistance 

 from this country. It had been 

 said by Mr. P. that government 

 ought to have waited to collect 

 full information how far the spirit 

 of liberty in the Spaniards went to 

 the amelioration of their condition ; 

 liow far the national feeling and 

 public spirit of Spain were such 

 as to justify ministers in hazarding 

 a British military force in aid of 

 its cause. Now, how the honour- 

 able mover could reconcile this 

 with his former admonition to 

 speed and celerity, it was not 

 within the compass of his intellec- 



tual powers to discover. As to the 

 selection of characters proper for 

 reporting to government the real 

 state and spirit of Spain, would it 

 have been rational for ministers to 

 listen to any man's opinion on that 

 point before the formation of the 

 Central Junta, which alone could 

 decideon the views of Spain ? And 

 were they to leave Spain and Por- 

 tugal to their destinies till that 

 event should have taken place ? — 

 The only rational question was, 

 whether it could be hoped that 

 Spain, with our assistance, would 

 be enabled to stand against France? 

 Spain had made an energetic effort. 

 She had borne up against the mi- 

 litary power of France with more 

 vigour, more constancy and bet- 

 ter success than those powers 

 which had been supported by for- 

 midable regular armies. There 

 had been many circumstances in 

 the case of Spain to inspire a con- 

 fident hope of its success. It was 

 known that the popular rising was 

 the simultaneous effort of the 

 whole country. All the provinces 

 had risen, he believed, within the 

 space of five or six days. In the 

 course of a very few months they 

 had collected an army in Anda- 

 lusia, and obtained a most decided 

 victory over the French under 

 Dupont, at the memorable battle 

 of Baylen, in which the Spanish 

 army was little superior in num- 

 bers to the enemy. The Spaniards 

 were so confident in their own 

 strength, that when general Spen- 

 cer applied to them to know whe- 

 ther he should come to their assist- 

 ance, they recommended his march- 

 ing to the relief of Portugal. Sara- 

 gossa also, as well as Andalusia, 

 presented a picture of encourage- 

 ment. Nor had Leon been defi- 

 cient ? 



