72 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



cient ? for at the battle of Rio Seco, 

 *he enemy had, by no means, the 

 advantage they boasted of. The 

 Spaniards had, in fact, obtained 

 decisive advantages, and would 

 iiave efl'ectuali)' defeated the ene- 

 my, if they had had the benefit 

 of cavalry* to follow up their suc- 

 cesses. What the Spanish army 

 might have been expected to have 

 done, if ithadhad sufficient cavalry, 

 could be easily inferred from what 

 they had done, when, in the course 

 of two months, it succeeded in 

 driving 100,000 men from the pro- 

 vinces they had occupied, and 

 confined them to the left banks of 

 the Ebro. 



With regard to the nature of 

 the co-operation that was adopted 

 by his majesty's ministers, and 

 the question, whether it was the 

 best that could be resorted to un- 

 der all the circumstances of the case, 

 he observed, that there were two ex- 

 treme opinions on this subject, and 

 a middle one. It was this interme- 

 diate opinion that had been adopted 

 by his majesty's ministers. One of 

 the two other opinions was, that if 

 Spain was really animated by the 

 spirit of true patriotism, she had 

 the elements of her own salvation 

 within herself, and did not want 

 British soldiers to fight her battles; 

 that our co-operation needed not 

 to go any further than supplies of 

 money, arms, clothing, ammuni- 

 tion, and whatever other necessa- 

 ries might be wanting. Than this 

 opinion, he thought nothing could 

 be more unwise. Nothing could 

 have tended mor.,- effectually to 

 confirm that reproach which had 

 been dealt out by the enemy 

 against us, than that we should 



not, in this instance, have taken 

 an active part ourselves. The 

 other extreme was, that there was 

 no medium between a great effort, 

 and the greatest of which we were 

 capable ; and that not a soldier 

 should be kept at home. Without 

 taking any notice of the effects 

 that such a measure might pro- 

 duce at home, if our utmost ef- 

 forts should be attended with dis- 

 aster, the thing would be in itself i 

 impracticable. There was a limit 

 beyond which ministers could not 

 go. In short, they must necessa- 

 rily keep within the limits of the 

 national credit, and it was unne- 

 cessary to say any thing more in 

 answer to this second extreme 

 opinion, than that it was impossi- 

 ble to act upon it. The only 

 question then was, where the ef- 

 fort made by his majesty's minis- 

 ters was sufficient. And this would 

 be best judged of by considering 

 it in a threefold relation : first, as 

 to its extent ; secondly, as to its 

 course ; and thirdly, as to its abi- 

 lity. With regard to its extent, 

 when information had been first 

 received by his majesty's minis- 

 ters, that a supply of British 

 troops was wished for, to act in 

 concert with the native armies in 

 Spain, there were sent, exclusive 

 of the 10,000 men under the Mar- 

 quis Romana, liberated in the 

 north of Europe, no less a force 

 than 45 or 50,000 men, nearly 

 50,000 rank and file into the pen- 

 insula. Besides this army, go- 

 vernment had issued orders that 

 the forces in the Mediterranean 

 should send out detachments to 

 act in Catalonia; though subse- 

 quent circumstances interposed to 



prevent 



See Vol. L. Hist. Eie. p. 213. 



