HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



73 



prevent those troops to be detach- 

 ed, from rendering that service 

 which it was then intended to era- 

 ploy them in. The next question 

 for the house to consider would 

 be, if ministers gave the army of 

 nearly 50,000 men a proper direc- 

 tion? He assured Mr. P. he was 

 not now going to the Pyrennees. 

 He could conceive a man of com- 

 mon sense going to St. Andero, 

 but he could not conceive a man 

 of sound sense going to the Py- 

 rennees. The port of St. Andero 

 might have been thought prefer- 

 able to Corunna; but that port 

 was extremely small, and in what 

 situation would an army there 

 have been in, with 40 or 50,000 

 French in the neighbourhood of 

 Vittoria ; and that army but half 

 equipped, and all the transports 

 gone away? He was not going 

 with Mr. P. to the Pyrennees, but 

 merely to the question he had put, 

 as to what could have detained 

 the British army so long during 

 the interval previous to the 27th 

 of October, the day on which 

 they made their first movement 

 from Portugal to Spain. He 

 (Lord C.) had, at an early pe- 

 riod of the campaign in Portugal, 

 directed that a communication 

 should be opened with the Spanish 

 generals on the subject of the co- 

 operation of the British armj^ in 

 Spain. A letter had been accord- 

 ingly sent to General Castanos on 

 that subject, but it did not reach 

 him till after the conclusion of the 

 convention of Cintra. On the 

 25th of September, orders had 

 been sent to Sir Hew Dalrymple to 

 move forward with his army to- 

 wards the north of Spain ; and on 

 the same day Sir David Baird re- 

 ceived orders to embark for Ferrol 



or Corunna. It was not, how- 

 ever, till the 29th of September, 

 that the first letter from Lord Wil- 

 liam Bentinck (who had been sent 

 to attend the supreme Central 

 Junta), was written, containing 

 the answers of the Junta to cer- 

 tain questions which he had been 

 directed to submit to them, as well 

 relating to the entrance of the 

 British army into Spain, as to the 

 manner in which it should be em- 

 ployed there. The answers were, , 

 that the fate of Spain depended 

 on the early co-operation of a Bri- 

 tish force ; and that they wished 

 our forces to be concentrated as 

 one British army. And General 

 Castanos received orders to con- 

 fer with Lord W. Bentinck, as to 

 the best mode of carrying those 

 wishes into effect. It was pro- 

 posed, that the army in Portugal 

 should make for Burgos, by the 

 route of Salamanca, and Sir Uavid 

 Baird debark his troops at Co- 

 runna. This intelligence was re- 

 ceived at Lisbon on the 8th of 

 October. 



While the question respecting 

 the operation of the British forces 

 in Spain was pending in Madrid, 

 the very same question was dis- 

 cussed in London, and the very 

 same decision was agreed to at the 

 same time. The Marquis of Ro- 

 mana's opinion on this subject was 

 in writing, and ready to be laid 

 upon the table of the house. 



With regard to the troops not 

 being immediately permitted to 

 land, Lord C. would only say, that 

 from a prior and distant application 

 made to his majesty's government 

 for British troops on the part of 

 the Juntas of Gallicia and Astu- 

 rias, ministers had a right to ex- 

 pect that no obstacle would be 



thrown 



