HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



77 



to proceed at once to what ought 

 to be the general plan of the cam- 

 paign, with a view of aflPording to 

 Spain any hope of Jinal deliver- 

 ance. On the former of these 

 modes of proceeding, though the 

 most tempting, he avoided giving 

 an opinion, because few but those 

 in office could possess the neces- 

 sary means of judging. 



It was not, at the same time, 

 true, that the one plan created any 

 necessity of giving up the other : 

 had the force sent to the Ebro been, 

 as it ought to have been, chiefly 

 cavalry (the force which the 

 Spaniards most wanted, and what 

 we had most ready and could 

 best spare) such a force, even 

 found in the event insufficient for 

 its immediate object, could still 

 have been able to take care of 

 itself, and to have retired in 

 safety through Spain, a country 

 of friends and allies, to that part 

 of the peninsula, where at all 

 events, and in every view, the 

 great mass of our force should be 

 collected. This part was no other 

 than the southern provinces, the 

 neighbourhood of Cadiz and Gib- 

 raltar. Whatever force we send 

 into Spain, could we be sure even 

 with all the aid that the armies or 

 masses of Spain could give us, 

 would be able to resist the hosts 

 that Buonaparte could pour in 

 against us, having for his supply 

 nothing less than a sort of inex- 

 haustible ocean, the whole popu- 

 lation of Europe ? — The inference 

 drawn from these premises by his 

 majesty's ministers seemed to be, 

 that we ought to send only a small 

 force ; but great or small, the 

 necessity of a retreat being pro- 

 vided seemed nearly equal. If 

 the army was large, the stake was 



greater ; and if small, the chance 

 was greater of losing it. Now 

 there was in the whole peninsula, 

 including Spain and Portugal, but 

 two places, and those in the same 

 quarter, from which a large body 

 of troops when pressed by a supe- 

 rior army, could hope to getaway, 

 viz. Cadiz and Gibraltar. To 

 meet in the south of Spain, a 

 British force of 100,000 men, 

 Buonaparte must bring over the 

 Pyrennees a force not less than 

 200,000, to say nothing of the 

 demand that would be made upon 

 him by the large Spanish army 

 that might be raised in that part 

 of Spain to co-operate with the 

 British army, and which the pre- 

 sence of a British force would 

 help to raise. Buonaparte would 

 have a whole kingdom, which he 

 must garrison behind him, if he 

 could either be sure of his sup- 

 plies, or make provision against 

 total destruction in case of a re- 

 verse : he must fight us at arms 

 length, while our strength would 

 be exerted within distance, with 

 an impregnable fortress at hand, 

 furnishing at once a safe retreat 

 in case of disaster, and a source of 

 endless supply, by means of its 

 safe and undisturbed communica- 

 tion with this country. And let 

 it not be supposed, that while the 

 army continued in the south, 

 Buonaparte might continue master 

 of the north. What mastery 

 could he have of any part of 

 Spain, while such an army could 

 be kept on foot in another? A 

 force raised to the greatest pos- 

 sible amount to which the mind 

 and means of the country, then 

 elevated above itself, and raised 

 to something of a preternatural 

 greatness, could have raised it, 



should 



