176 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



ing near the frontier fortresses of 

 Catalonia and Navarre; or con- 

 centrating their force in the north- 

 ern provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, 

 and Biscay. To retain a sure foot- 

 ing in Spain by keeping open the 

 communication between Bayonne 

 and Madrid; retaining possession 

 of the capital and other towns in 

 the interior of Spain ; the northern 

 provinces, together with Navarre 

 and Catalonia ; and to complete 

 the conquest of all that lay on the 

 east side of the Ebro, by reducing 

 the fortified cities of Saragossa 

 and Gerona, were the objects that 

 seemed to bound the views of the 

 French in Spain during the first 

 part of 1809, and until the deci- 

 sive battle, July 5th, of Wagram 

 on the Danube. 



But while hostilities were car- 

 ried on with alternate success in 

 Asturias and Biscay, and several 

 important places were taken, and 

 retaken by the joint exertions of 

 the Spanish patriots, supported by 

 English ships of war, a line of 

 which extended from Cape Finis- 

 terre to the Garonne, the French 

 were, at the close of June, ob- 

 liged to evacuate both Ferrol and 

 Corunna. St. Jago de Compos- 

 tella, the capital of Gallicia, fell 

 into the hands of the patriots. St. 

 Vigo too, garrisoned by 1,400 

 French, surrendered to the Gaih'- 

 cians, supported by two English 

 frigates. The French were after- 

 wards driven from the towns of 

 Tuy and Viana. In a word, all 

 Gallicia was evacuated by the 

 French. The corps under marshal 

 Soult having evacuated Oporto, 

 together with that of Ney, which 

 had evacuated Corunna and Fer- 

 rol, proceeded through Leon to- 

 wards Madrid, threatened by for- 



midable preparations on the paft 

 of both the Spaniards and the 

 English. Three armies were form- 

 ed for acting, it would seem, in 

 concert (rather in conjunction) 

 with each other, against the 

 French, and even advancing on 

 Madrid. One of these armies was 

 commanded by general Cuesta, 

 another by general Venegas, and 

 the third, which was the auxiliary 

 British army, by sir Arthur Wel- 

 lesley. 



There was a french army in. La 

 Mancha, under general Sebas- 

 tiani ; and one under Victor, duke 

 of Belluno, in New Castille. These 

 two bodies drew nearer both to 

 each other and the capital, and 

 concentrated their force at a short 

 distance and to the south-west of 

 Toledo; a position admirably well 

 chosen for making head against 

 the force of the allies, cutting oft' 

 their effective communication with 

 each other, and attacking them in 

 detail. 



The position of the allied army 

 was as follows. Cuesta, with what 

 might be called the central army 

 (though all the three armies were 

 at a considerable and too great a 

 distance from each other) was 

 contiguous to Talavera del Reyna, 

 from whence the French had just 

 retreated. Venegas, with the right 

 wing, was descending from the 

 heights, called the mountains of 

 Toledo, Sir Arthur Wellesley, 

 with the left, occupied a position 

 north of the Tagus, in the vici- 

 nity of Monte Claros. Cuesta 

 had under his immediate orders 

 about 38,000 men, of which 12,000 

 were cavalry ; the right wing, 

 commanded by Venegas, was 

 26,000 strong ; and the left, under 

 sir Arthur Wellesley, 30,000. 



By 



