186 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1S09. 



the enemy while he was engaged 

 with us. If the right wing had 

 been drawn out of this strong and 

 importantground.or had abandoned 

 it when cannonaded by the enemy, 

 Sir Arthur would have been ex- 

 posed to an attack on his riglit 

 flank. This danger the Spaniards 

 averted by maintaining, and to a 

 certain extent at least defending, 

 their position. Therefore they had 

 some share, though nothing like 

 that of the British, in the victory 

 of Talavera. 



The joy of victory was of ex- 

 ceedingly short duration. The 

 victorious quickly found itself 

 in the situation of a vanquished 

 army. On the 2nd of August in- 

 telligence was received, that Soult, 

 Ney, and Mortier having formed 

 a junction, had advanced through 

 Estremadura to fall on the rear of 

 the British: andtiiat the French, in 

 two columns had already entered 

 Piacentia. As Victor, though re- 

 pulsed at Talavera, would advance 

 again against the allies as soon as 

 he should hear of the junction and 

 inarch just mentioned, there was 

 no time for doubt or delay. Tiie 

 allied army was now to be saved, 

 in the words of Sir Arthur Welles- 

 ley, only, «' by great celerity of 

 movement." General Cuesta, the 

 moment the intelligence was re- 

 ceived, called on the British ge- 

 neral, and proposed that half of 

 the army should march to the 

 rear to oppose the enemy, while 

 the other half should remain at 

 Talavera. Sir A. Wellesley said, 

 that if by half the army he meant 

 half of each army, he could only 

 answer, that he was ready either 

 to go or to stay with the whole 

 British army, but that he could not 

 separate it. General Cuesta then 



desired him to choose whether to 

 go or stay. Sir Arthur chose to go, 

 thinking, he states in his dis- 

 patches, " that the British troops 

 were most likely to do the busi- 

 ness effectually and without con- 

 test." General Cuesta was ac- 

 cordingly left at Talavera. If he 

 should be compelled to quit this 

 post, it was requested and ex- 

 pected by'Sir Arthur Wellesle}', 

 that he was to bring the wounded, 

 amounting in number to near 4,000, 

 along with him. 



On the third of August the Bri- 

 tish arm}' marched to Oropesa. In 

 the evening of that day advice was 

 received, that the French, stated 

 to be 30,000 strong, having ad- 

 vanced from Piacentia, had got 

 between the British and the bridge 

 of Almaraz ; and nearly at the 

 same time, that general Cuesta 

 was on the point of leaving Tala- 

 vera, letting most of the wounded 

 and sick fall into the hands of the 

 French, from the want of means 

 of conveyance. On the other side, 

 there was reason to expect, as soon 

 as general Cuesta's march should 

 be known, the advance of Victor's 

 corps, 2.5,000 strong (after leav- 

 ing 10,000 to watch Venegas) to 

 Talavera. Our army, if unsuc- 

 cessful in a contest with either 

 Victor, or Soult and Ney, would 

 have been without retreat; and if 

 Soult and Ney, avoiding an action, 

 had retired before it, and waited 

 the arrival of Victor, it would have 

 been exposed to a general action 

 with at least 50,000 men, and 

 equally without a retreat. Sir A. 

 Wellesley, in these circumstances, 

 judged it advisable to retire to 

 the bridge of Arzo Bispo, where 

 he crossed the Tagus on Augusts, 

 from whence he continued his 



route 



