HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



187 



route to Deleytosa, and from thence 

 to Badajoz.* General Cuesta too 

 retreated by the bridge of Arzo 

 Bispo, where he crossed the river 

 on the night of the 5th. About 

 half the number of the sick and 

 wounded were brought away from 

 Talavera ; the oiher half remained 

 there, and were treated by the 

 French with great humanity. The 

 reason given by general Cuesta for 

 his leaving Talavera was, that the 

 enemy was n)oviDg upon his flank, 

 and had returned to St. Ollala 

 in his front ; and farther, that 

 without his assistance, Sir Arthur 

 would not be strong enough for 

 the united corps of French coming 

 from Piacentia. " These reasons, 

 Sir Arthur Wellesley tells us in his 

 dispatches of August 8, did not 

 appear sufiicient to him for giving 

 up so important a post as Tala- 

 vera, for exposing the combined 

 armies to an attack in front and 

 rear, and for abandoning his hos- 

 pital." But Sir Arthur did not 

 state the whole of Cuesta's reason- 

 ing. General Cuesta represented 

 to Sir Arthur, " not only that he 

 thought it his duty to fly to the 

 aid of liis good ally, but lest, in 

 the case of a defeat of the British 

 army, the Spaniards should find 

 themselves between Victor and 

 Soult, with ihe most perfect cer- 

 tainty that tliey must share the 

 same fate if they should remain at 

 Talavera.'' Under these impres- 

 sions general Cuesta, following the 

 same route with tiie British, ar- 

 rived, August 4, at Oropesa; 

 where he was surprised to find 

 them, as he had supposed that Sir 



Arthur Wellesley had gone in 

 quest of the enemy, who was still 

 at Naval Moral. Still greater was 

 general Cuesta's surprise to learn 

 that general Wellesley was deter- 

 mined not to hazard an action 

 with Soult, without securing a re- 

 treat in case of discomfiture, and 

 for this end taking up a position 

 beyond the Tagus. Gen. Cuesta 

 urged to the British commander, 

 that tlie accounts he had received of 

 the force of the enemy were greatly 

 exaggerated; and that it was by no 

 means sufficient for a conflict with 

 the two armies : the British and 

 Spanish armies united could easily 

 defeat and dispose of the French ; 

 but if general Wellesley should 

 retreat beyond the bridge of Arzo 

 Bispo, a passage would be opened 

 for a junction between Soult and 

 Victor."! This reasoning of the 

 Spanish general was certainly not 

 unplausible, and would not, it may 

 be fairly presumed, have been 

 without effect on the mind of Sir 

 Arthur Wellesley, who was any 

 thing but deficient in personal 

 courage, if he could have reckon- 

 ed on the prompt and steady co- 

 operation of our Spanish allies, 

 political and military. But from 

 a good deal of uniform experience 

 he had learnt to make a just esti- 

 mate of both the one and the other. 

 A great majority of the su- 

 preme and central junta was com- 

 posed of weak and feeble charac- 

 ters, chosun, not on account of 

 their personal merit, but by the 

 preponderating influence of great 

 families, and were very ill qualified 

 to call forth, combine, and direct 



the 



.482. 



" See dispatches from lord viscount Wellington. App. Chroii. p. 48 

 + Note troni don IVIartin ile Garay, secretary of the junta, to the marquis of 

 Wellesley, October 3, 1809. .^ .' J » i 



