HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



191 



which Spain had suffered so inucli 

 and been so lavish of her blood. 

 Spain must learn to administer her 

 resources, and to ameliorate the 

 organization and discipline of her 

 armies before she could expect to 

 derive any advantage from the 

 support and co-operation of 

 strangers. Until some change 

 should be effected in the distribu- 

 tion or application of the military 

 resources of Spain, and in the 

 state of its army, no British force 

 could attempt with safety to co- 

 operate with Spanish troops on 

 Spanish ground.* 



The greatest aid, the marquis 

 of Wellesley said, to be expected 

 by Spain from an English army 

 should be confined to that kind of 

 occasional concert and co-opera- 

 tion which lately took place be- 

 tween the forces commanded by 

 Sir A. Wellesley and those under 

 the orders of general Cuesta. In 

 case of a British army of 30,000 

 men being employed in a cam- 

 paign in Spain, our troops should 

 be assured in the first place of 

 being provided with the means of 

 movement and with necessary pro- 

 visions. In case of necessity that 

 our troops should retreat, the 

 supreme command of the Spanish 

 armies should be vested in the 

 commander-in-chief of the Eng- 

 lish army; and an English garri- 

 son should be established in Cadiz, 

 if these conditions should be 

 deemed indispensably necessary for 

 our security in Spain. The dis- 

 position of the people was in ge- 



neral favourable to the great 

 cause in which the nation was en- 

 gaged, and the great mass of the 

 population in Spain certainly pre- 

 sented means for organizing a 

 powerful government, and ele- 

 ments for the formation of an excel- 

 lent army. But in the higher and 

 in the middling classes too many 

 traces were to be found of French 

 intrigue, and of its success. In 

 those two classes one could per- 

 ceive a disposition to watch events, 

 and to practise and keep terms 

 with the party that should ultimately 

 prevail in the present struggle.f 

 Many persons of this descriptioDp 

 if they received no favours at the 

 hands of government, were never- 

 theless never in any way molested 

 by it. Thus no pains were taken to 

 form one public opinion, to culti- 

 vate and exalt public spirit, and 

 to direct its energy to great na- 

 tional objects. The population of 

 the country had not yet furnished 

 the proportion of recruits de- 

 manded by the dangers of the 

 country : nor could any accession 

 of numbers avail without a change 

 in the organization and discipline 

 of the army. Many officers of 

 the army, in the most important 

 stations, made no secret of their 

 hostility to the cause of Spain and 

 her allies, and were not sufficiently 

 watched by government. • On a 

 review of the principal events of 

 the last campaign, it appeared im- 

 possible to account for the con- 

 duct of some Spanish generals and 

 other officers on any other hypo- 

 thesis, 



" Dispatch from the marquis of "Wellesley to secretary Canning. Seville, Sep- 

 tember 2, 1809. 



■J- Thus in the war of the Succession, a great many of the nobles of Spain were 

 in a continual state of vacillation between the side of Charles of Austria and 

 Philip" of Bourbon, according as the fortwne of either rosc W fell in the balance 

 amidst the vicissitudes of war. 



