/HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



193 



care of the regency should be to 

 reform the whole military system 

 of Spain. 



On the whole, the marquis of 

 Wellesleyjwas of opinion that, in all 

 events, even the very worst to be 

 apprehended was, that the disposi- 

 tion and character of the Spanish 

 nation would prolong the difficul- 

 ties that the French had met with 

 from their first attempt to subdue 

 that country. The grand obstacle 

 to the deliverance of Spain was, 

 beyond all doubt, the state of its 

 own government ; but still, even 

 if the faulty state of government, 

 so favourable to the success of the 

 French arms, should be continued, 

 a long interval of time must elapse 

 before a French government could 

 be established in Spain, during 

 which interval events would hap- 

 pen and circumstances occur, 

 which might be improved for the 

 advancement of British interests, 

 both in Spain and her colonies.* 



In perfect unison with the sen- 

 timents and views of the marquis 

 were those of his brother Sir A. 

 Wellesley, who, in a letter to the 

 marquis, dated at Merida, August 

 2, 1809, wrote as follows : " In the 

 battle of Talavera, in which almost 

 the whole of the Spanish army was 

 engaged, whole corps threw down 

 their arras in my presence and 

 saved themselves by flight, | al- 



though they were neither attacked 

 nor menaced with an attack, but 

 merely frightened, I believe, at 

 their own fire. In the public orders 

 of general Cuesta, after praising 

 the conduct of his army, he de- 

 clares his intention of decimating 

 the fugitives ; an intention which 

 he afterwards fulfilled. Those base 

 solders in their flight from Talavera 

 pillaged every tlung that came in 

 their way, even the baggage of the 

 English army, which was at that 

 very time fighting in their cause.;}: 

 There cannot be a doubt that in 

 any farther conjoint operations 

 the whole burthen must fall on 

 us: and certainly the English 

 army ought not to be considered 

 as sufficiently strong for being 

 the only corps to be opposed to a 

 French army not less than 70,000 

 strong. On considering therefore 

 the object in view, and calculating 

 our means and our dangers, I am 

 of opinion I ought to renounce all 

 ideas of co-operation with the 

 Spanish army ; which opinion 

 your excellency will communicate 

 to the supreme junta. At the 

 same time I am well aware of the 

 difficulties into which that govern- 

 ment must be thrown, if its armies 

 should be seized with any of those 

 panic fears to which they are sub- 

 ject, and take to flight, leaving all 

 behind them to certain loss and ruin. 



To 



" Dispatch from the Marquis of Wellesley to Mr. Secretary Canning. Seville, 

 September 15, 1809. Included in the Correspondence relative to Spain and Por- 

 tugal, laid before parliament. 



f It may be allowed to a commander of an allied army to pass over, in 

 his public dispatches, egregious misbehaviour in the conduct of his allies. In 

 Sir Arthur's dispatch from Talavera, July 29, above quoted, the reader is led to 

 suppose that the whole of the Spanish army was not engaged, but that such of 

 them that were did their duty. Here we are told that the whole were engaged, 

 but that whole corps failed in their duty. 



* Of the officers who headed the fugitives, we are told in another part 

 of the correspondence about the affairs oi Spain and Portugal that a fourth part, 

 by the orders of Cuesta, was put to death. 

 Vol.. LI. O 



