HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



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determined the Austrian govern- 

 ment to enter on war witli France 

 at this particular time was the 

 great distance of Buonaparte's 

 strongest army. In order to taiie 

 advantage of this circumstance, it 

 was necessary to act with promp- 

 titude and celerity. And as an 

 immense line of frontier might be 

 attacked by the French, whom it 

 was therefore necessary to keep 

 in check, the Austrians could not 

 concentrate their forces without 

 opening a passage to Vienna for five 

 different French armies, viz. from 

 the Venetian territory, from Ba- 

 varia, from Franconia, from Sax- 

 ony, and, lastly, from Silesia. This 

 concentration of the Austrian 

 forces too would have required 

 much time, and the combined 

 movements of so many troops 

 would have been the signal of war 

 to Buonaparte. But of all the 

 passages that might be opened the 

 most to be dreaded by Austria was 

 that to Vienna from Munich. It 

 was the shortest and the easiest, 

 as well as that on which the 

 greatest number of troops could 

 be brought to march at the same 

 time. It was in this direction, of 

 course, that the main force of the 

 Austrians was to proceed, and 

 bear on Bavaria, for the defence 

 of the Austrian dominions. It is 

 farther to be considered that the 

 most important conquest that 

 could be made by Austria in a 

 military point of view, as appears 

 from a single glance at her 

 frontiers, was the Tyrol. That 

 as the course of the war would in 

 its progress be directed by that 

 of the Danube it would be neces- 

 sary to have the command of a 

 bridge across that river, even in 

 Bavaria, for establishing a com- 

 munication between the troops of 



Austria and those of Bohemia ; 

 and that the most convenient point 

 for such a communication was Ra- 

 tisbon, as it is nearest to the two 

 routes of Egra and Pilsen, between 

 Bohemia and Bavaria. 



The state and distribution of 

 the Austrian arms, in the begin- 

 ning of April, 1809, was as fol- 

 lows. The whole of the army 

 was divided into nine corps, each 

 corps consisting of 30 or 40,000 

 men. The first six of these corps 

 were under the immediate orders 

 of his serene highness the arch- 

 duke Charles, commander in chief 

 of all the forces. Under the arch- 

 duke the count de Bellegarde was 

 at the head of the first corps ; 

 count Kollowrath of the second ; 

 the prince of Hohenzollern of the 

 third ; the baron of Rosenberg of 

 the fourth ; the archduke Lewis 

 of the fifth ; and general Hiller of 

 the sixth. The seventh corps was 

 sent under the archduke Ferdi- 

 nand into Poland ; and the eighth 

 and ninth to Italy, under the 

 archduke John. The lieutenant- 

 general of the eighth corps was 

 the marquis of Chastellar ; of the 

 ninth corps general Guilay. Be- 

 sides these corps there were two 

 of reserve ; one of 20,000 men, 

 commanded by prince John of 

 Lichtenstein ; the other of 10,000 

 under the orders of general Kin- 

 mayer : and troops to the number 

 of 25,000 in the Tyrol, Croatia, 

 and in small parties acting as par- 

 tizans on the confines of Bohemia. 

 In addition to all these there was a 

 kind of militia in the interior of 

 the Austrian kingdoms and pro- 

 vinces, called the land-wehr. So 

 that it was computed, that when 

 the archduke Charles entered on 

 the campaign, be had at his disposal 

 not much less than 400,000 men. 



In 



