212 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



in the pre?ent campaign, were faul- 

 ty. Instead of taking advantage of 

 tlie great superiority of iiis num- 

 bers, his army heing little short vf 

 200,000 men, he marched with his 

 undivided force to one part, 

 namely, Ratisbon, suffered Davoust 

 with his corps to escape, and gave 

 Buonaparte an opportunity of beat- 

 ing the Austrian corps one after 

 another. The operations of the 

 archduke Charles, it was observed, 

 were so ill combined, that there 

 were no less than three corps of 

 the Austrian army that were not 

 engaged in the battles of Abens- 

 berg, Eckmiill, and Ratisbon ; al- 

 though these French corps or 

 armies were not at a g "eater dis- 

 tance than one day's march 

 from the Austrian army. When 

 the archduke found it necessary to 

 cross to the left bank of the 

 Danube by the bridge at Ratisbon, 

 he should have withdrawn the gar- 

 rison there and cut down the bridge. 

 If he could not withstand the im- 

 petuosity of the French with his 

 whole force, how could it be ex- 

 pected that it should be withstood 

 by 10 or 12,000 troops, including 

 the cavalry and others stationed 

 without the city for covering it, 

 as above related, and the garrison. 

 In truth, the conduct of the arch- 

 duke on this occasion, bore a 

 strong resemblance to that of Sir 

 A. Wellesley, when he chose the 

 option given him by Cuesta, of 

 going or remaining at Talavera. — 

 The archduke, instead of attack- 

 ing Davoust at Ratisbon, while 

 Buonaparte was in pursuit of 

 field-marshal Hiller to Lintz and 

 Vienna, and of obliging the French, 

 by this diversion, to halt in Bavaria, 

 (where Buonaparte had just the 

 sanie reasons to defend the passage 



of the Danube against the arch- 

 duke, as the archduke had to de- 

 fend the passage of the Danube 

 against Buonaparte at Vienna) ran 

 with the main Austrian army along 

 the left bank of the Danube after 

 Buonaparte to Vienna. After the de- 

 feat at Aspern and Essling, Buona- 

 parte extended his right wing along 

 the Danube into Hungary, exercis- 

 ing his troops by excursions, and 

 thus preparing them for a fresh, 

 general, and decisive engagement. 

 The same motives that induced 

 Buonaparte to occupy the territory 

 of his adversary to the right, should 

 have induced the Austrians also to 

 have extended their right, and 

 made incursions into the north of 

 Germany. They might have em- 

 ployed in this xjuarter, besides 

 what regular troops could be 

 spared, 30,000/. militia of Bohemia. 

 It should have been their object to 

 place Germany in a state in which 

 that large and populous country 

 alone would have engrossed the 

 whole attention of Buonaparte, 

 namely, a state of insurrection. 

 That the German nation was ripe 

 for such an explosion was manifest 

 from the insurrections that burst 

 forth in so many parts of the Ger- 

 man empire, even divided as it was 

 into so many hands. It may easily 

 be conceived what the 80,000 Ger- 

 mans who were forced to fight the 

 battles of Buonaparte against the 

 Austrians could have done, if they 

 had been encouraged by the pre- 

 sence of a great Austrian army. 

 The king of Saxony, who like the 

 rest of Buonaparte's vassal princes 

 had been forced to take up arms 

 against Austria, was stripped of a 

 great part of his dominions by the 

 army sent under the archduke Fer- 

 dinand into Poland, and compelled 



to 



