APPENDIX tothe CHRONICLE. 363 



French through the mountains.— 

 They abandoned their dwellings at 

 our approach, drove away their 

 carts, oxen, and every thing that 

 could be of the smallest aid to the 

 army. The consequence has been, 

 that our sick have been left behind ; 

 and when our horses or mulesfailed, 

 whichon such marches, and through 

 such a country, was the case to a 

 great extent, baggage, ammunition, 

 stores, &c. and even money, were 

 necessarily destroyed orabandoned, 

 I am sorry to say, that the army, 

 whose conduct I had such reason to 

 extol on its march through Portu- 

 gal, and on its arrival in Spain, has 

 totally changed itschai'actersinceit 

 began to retreat. I can say nothing 

 in its favour, but that when there 

 was a prospect of fighting the ene- 

 my, the men were then orderly and 

 seemed pleased and determined to 

 do their duty. In front of Villa 

 Franca the French came up with the 

 reserve, with which I was covering 

 the retreat of the army; they attack- 

 ed it at Calcabellos. I retired, co- 

 vered by the 95th regiment, and 

 marched that night to Herresias, 

 and from thence to Nogales and Lu- 

 go, where I had ordered the different 

 divisions which preceded to haltand 

 I collect. At Lugo, the French again 

 I came up with us. They attacked 

 i our advanced posts on the 6th and 

 7th, and were repulsed in both at- 

 tempts, with little loss on our side. 

 I heard from the prisoners taken, 

 that three divisions of the French 

 army were come up, commanded 

 by marshal Soult; 1 therefore ex- 

 pected to be attacked on the morn- 

 ing of the 8th. It was my wish to 

 come to that issue ; I had perfect 

 confidence in the valour of the 

 troops, and it was only by crippling 

 the enemy that we could hope either 

 Vot. LI. 



to retreat or to embark unmolested. 

 I made every preparation to receive 

 the attack, and drew out the army 

 in the morning to offer battle. This 

 was not marshal Souk's object. He 

 either did not think himself suffici- 

 ently strong, or he wished to play a 

 surer game by attacking us on our 

 march, or during our embarkation. 

 The country was intersected, and 

 his position too strong for me to 

 attack with an inferior force. The 

 want of provisions would not enable 

 me to wait longer ; I marched that 

 night ; and in two forced marches by 

 advancing for six or eight hours in 

 the rain, I reached Betanzos on the 

 10th instant. At Lugo, I was sen- 

 sible of the impossibility of reaching 

 Vigo, which was at too great a dis- 

 tance, and offered no advantages to 

 embark in the face of an enemy. 

 My intention was then to have re- 

 treated to the peninsula of Betanzos, 

 where I hoped to find a position to 

 cover the embarkation of the army 

 in Ares or Redes Bays; but having 

 sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by 

 his report I was determined to pre- 

 fer this place. I gave notice to the 

 admiral of my intention, and begged 

 that the transports might be brought 

 to Corunna; had I found them here 

 on my arrival, on the 11th, the em- 

 barkation would easily have been 

 effected, for I had gained several 

 marches on the French. They have 

 now come up with us, the transports 

 are not arrived; my position in front 

 of this place is a very bad one; and 

 this place, if I am forced to retire 

 into it, is commanded within mus- 

 ket shot, and the harbour will be 

 so commanded by cannon on the 

 coast, that no ship will be able to 

 lay in it. In short, my lord, gene- 

 ral Stewart will inform you how cri- 

 tical oursituation is. It has been re- 

 2 B commended 



