484 ANxNUAL REGISTER, 180$. 



go or stay, and I preferred to go, 

 from thinking tiiat the British 

 troops were most likely to do the 

 business effectually, and without 

 contest; and from being of opinion 

 that to open the communication 

 through Flacentia, although very 

 important to them, was more im- 

 portant to us than to the Spanish 

 army. With this decision, general 

 Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied. 



The movements of the enemy in 

 ourfront since the first, had induced 

 me to be of opinion, that despairing 

 of forcing us at Talavera, they in- 

 tended to force a passage by Esca- 

 Jona, and thus to open a communi- 

 cation with the French corps com- 

 ing from Placentia. 



This suspicion was confirmed on 

 the night o1 the 2nd, byletters receiv- 

 ed from Sir Robert Wilson, ofwbich 

 linclosecopies; andbefore Iquitted 

 Talavera on the 3rd, I waited upon 

 general O'Donoghue and conversed 

 with him upon the whole of our 

 situation, and pointed out to him 

 the possibilit}' that in the case of 

 the enemy coming through Esca- 

 Jona, gen. Cucsia might find him- 

 self obliged to quit Talavera, before 

 I should be able to return to him; 

 and I urged him to collect ail the 

 carts that could be got, in order to 

 remove our hospital. At his desire 

 Tput the purport of this conversa- 

 tion in writing, and sent him a letter 

 to be laid before general Cuesta, 

 of which I inclose a copy. 



The British army marched on 

 the 3rd to Oropesa, general Basse- 

 court's Spanish corps being at 

 Centinello, where I desired that it 

 might halt the next day, in order 

 that I might be nearer it. 



About five o'clock in the evening, 

 I heard that the French had ar- 

 rived from Placentia at Navalmoral, 



whereby they were between us and 

 the bridge of Almaraz. 



About an hour afterwards, I re- 

 ceived from gen. O'Donoghue the 

 letter and itsinclosures, of which I 

 inclose copies, announcing to me 

 the intention of general Cuesta to 

 march from Talavera in the evening 

 and to leave there my hospital, ex- 

 cepting such men as could be 

 moved by the means healready had, 

 on the ground of his apprehension 

 that I was not strong enough for 

 the corps coming from Placentia, 

 and that the enemy was moving 

 upon his flank, and had returned to 

 Santa Olalla in his front. 



I acknowledge that these reasons 

 did not appear to rae sufficient for 

 giving up soimportant a postas Ta- 

 lavera, for exposing the combined 

 armies to an attack in front and rear 

 at the same time, and for abandon- 

 ing my hospital ; and I wrote the 

 letter of which I inclose a copy. 



This unfortunately reached the 

 general after he had marched, and 

 he arrived at Oropesa shortly after 

 daylight, on the morning of the 4th. 



The question what was to be 

 done, was then to be considered.— 

 Theenemy,stated to be thirty thou- 

 sand strong, but at all events con- 

 sistingofthecorpsof SouliandNey, 

 either united, or not very distant 

 from each other, and supposed by 

 marshal Jourdan and Joseph Buo- 

 naparte to be sufficiently strong to 

 attack the British army, stated to be 

 twentj'-five thousand strong, were 

 on one side, in possession of the 

 high road to the passage of the 

 Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge at 

 which place we knew had been re- 

 moved, although the boats still ne- 

 cessarily remained in the river. 



On the other side, we had reason 

 to expect the advance of Victor's 



corps 



