14 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1810. 



a single officer of rank and clia- 

 racter, under his command, who 

 either advised the second cam- 

 paign, or who would have been 

 willing to stake any part of his re- 

 putation on that advice. He did 

 not know what there was to put 

 in the opposite scale. Perhaps one 

 might form some idea of the na- 

 ture of the information on which 

 his majesty's ministers proceeded, 

 from that of the agents whom they 

 spread over the face of the penin- 

 sula, and who were understood to 

 maintain a correspondence with 

 government at home. These mis- 

 sionaries were, for the most part, 

 military men, not very high in the 

 profession, and who were of course 

 delighted with the honours they 

 received. It was natural enough 

 that persons of this description, 

 and that without imputing to them 

 any deliberate dereliction of their 

 duty, should represent only the 

 fair side of things ; give a little 

 colouring to whatever was good, 

 and extenuate all that was discou- 

 raging. They might even deserve 

 praise for their activity and spirit ; 

 but he really believed, that out of 

 the whole number there was 

 scarcely a cool-headed, sound- 

 judging man, scarcely one whose 

 opinion was much better than that 

 of the famous colonel Charmilly 

 himself The opinion of major 

 Carrol stood on one side, the opi- 

 nion of sir John Moore on the 

 other, and ministers preferred that 

 of major Carrol. The flight of 

 the Supreme Junta to Seville had 

 not cured them of tlie inactivity 

 they had displayed at Aranjuez. 

 Of all their enemies the only one 

 they had been able to subdue, was 

 the press. They hid done nothing 

 for the people, and nothing to en- 



lighten the people. No change 

 could be expected in such a go- 

 vernment, except from some great 

 effort of the people themselves. 

 And yet without such a change, 

 how was it possible to hope for 

 success ? 



The fundamental error which 

 pervaded the whole of our opera» 

 tions respecting Spain, consisted 

 in supposing that the Spanish 

 troops were capable of acting in 

 conjunction with ours. Now it 

 was clearly established, both by 

 the events of sir J. Moore's cam- 

 paign, and by every other species 

 of evidence, that the Spaniards 

 neither had a regular army, nor 

 any thing that was capable of co- 

 operating with a regular army ; 

 and that whenever the French 

 chose to concentrate their force, 

 at the risk of a rising in that part 

 of the country, whichsucha move- 

 ment would compel them to aban- 

 don, and which they might easily 

 re-occupy when they had obliged 

 us to retire, they would meet with 

 very little opposition from our al- 

 lies, and that we should have vir- 

 tually to contend with them single- 

 handed. It was the art of that 

 great general and politician, king 

 William III. to render defeatharm- 

 less. It was the art of ministers 

 and generals of these days to make 

 victory itself unavailing. The suc- 

 cesses at Oporto, and afterwards 

 Talavera, for which the highest 

 honours and panegyrics had been 

 bestowed on our general ! were 

 attended with no permanent ad- 

 vantages whatever, and in their 

 consequences resembled not vic- 

 tories, but defeats. 



With regard to the expedition 

 to Walchercn, whether we consi- 

 dered the plan, the object, or the 



