HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



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neighbouring powers. The Scheldt 

 appeared the most eligible point 

 of attack, as more nearl}' connect- 

 ed with the commercial views of 

 this country. Antwerp was an ob- 

 ject of great political importaticc 

 to France, and a descent there 

 was more likely to call forth 

 Buonaparte's attention than an 

 attack on any other place. It was 

 his practice to slight any distant 

 diversions that might be made, 

 and stedfastly pursue his main ob- 

 ject. But wiien he should thus be 

 attacked in a vital point, it was 

 reasonable to suspect that it would 

 operate powerfully in favour of 

 our allies. He was not ignorant 

 of the nature of the climate at that 

 season of the year : but it was not 

 intended that the army should be 

 locked up there for such a length 

 of time. It was a coup de main 

 against the naval power of the 

 enemy that was intended, and 

 not the capture of Walcheren 

 alone. It was expected that the 

 army would be employed in a 

 dry country, between Walcheren 

 and Bergen-op-Zoom. No ob- 

 jtect of magnitude was expected 

 to oppose our retaining Walche- 

 ren. It had never been considered 

 as an axiom, that the risk attend- 

 ing the occupancy of that island 

 should deter us from taking it. 

 We held it thirty-one j'cars, 

 during the Barrier Treaty, and 

 had since itad it in our posses- 

 sion. With respect to tiic eva- 

 cuation of tlie island, he had had 

 no share in the measures of go- 

 vernment. 



General Tarleton thought that 

 a most peculiar degree of respon- 

 sibility lay upon lord Chatham, 

 who was at the same time a minis- 

 ter and commander of the expe- 

 dition to Walcheren. That expe- 



dition had been attended with a 

 greater expence of treasure, and 

 sacrifice of human life, thart al- 

 most any other in our history; and 

 yet it had most completely failed 

 in its objects. The expedition to 

 Spain was equally a subject de- 

 serving inquiry. We first heard 

 of Soult's army being completely 

 defeated, or dispersed, in the 

 north of Portugal. And yet this 

 army appeared soon afterwards 

 in the field, and made lord Wel- 

 lington retreat from Talavera. 

 The march to Talavera was most 

 imprudent. When that able offi- 

 cer, the gallant sir John Moore, 

 was entering Spain, he was told 

 that a body of 10,000 men would 

 completely exhaust that part of 

 the country of its provisions. 

 The general stated, at length, 

 the superior advantages which, 

 he conceived, would have result- 

 ed from employing 30,000 Bri- 

 tish troops in a diversion in Italy, 

 under sir John Moore. This 

 might not have been agreeable to 

 the Wellesleys ; but it might 

 have prevented tlie army of Eu- 

 gene Napoleon from joining 

 Buonaparte, which would have 

 been, in his opinion, the most 

 important service that it was 

 in our power to have rendered 

 to Austria, and consequently to 

 Spain. 



Mr. Canning, after a great deal 

 of prefatory matter, particularly 

 sarcastical allusions to the conduct 

 of the preceding administration, 

 said, that he never would have 

 consented to the expedition, if he 

 had conceived that nothing greater 

 would have been accomplished. 

 But he did consider, that the pos- 

 session of the naval arsenal at Ant- 

 werp would have been an object 

 of the first importance, as a British 



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