30 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1810. 



of driving the enemy's troops be- 

 fore Iiim, and obtaining possession 

 of the capital, Madrid. The 

 French troops, in Spain, at that 

 time, occupied a defensive Hne of 

 positions, from Toledo to Sala- 

 manca. On the advance of lord 

 WelHngton into Spain, they left 

 their positions, and concentrated 

 their forces to oppose him.* Lord 

 Wellington marched, in the direc- 

 tion of Madrid, as far as Talavera ; 

 where he was obliged to stop for 

 want of provisions, and the means 

 of transport. The battle was 

 fought, and the enemy for the mo- 

 ment repulsed. But the general 

 object of the advance into Spain 

 was lost. The enemy retained 

 possession of the capital, and the 

 British troops were obliged to re- 

 treat. It had been said that lord 

 Wellington had displayed great 

 skill in the dispositions he made 

 for battle. Lord Grey would not 

 agree in that, opinion. The posi- 

 tion on the left had not been suf- 

 ficiently secured or taken advan- 

 tage of — there was much also to 

 blame in the conduct of lord Wel- 

 lington, witii respect to the Spa- 

 nish troops ; though certainly the 

 dispatch of the Spanish general, 

 gave a very different account of 

 the conduct of those troops, from 

 that given in the dispatch of lord 

 Wellington. But if lord Welling- 

 ton believed the Spanish troops to 

 be of such a description that tliey 

 could not be trusted to meet the 

 enemy in a situation of such 

 imminent peril at Talavera; if 

 lord Wellington held such an opi- 

 nion of the Spanish troops, why 

 did he give the Spanish general 

 the option, either of defending the 



passes against the advance of the 

 French army under the duke ol' 

 Dalmatia, which threatened the 

 flank and rear of the British, or 

 taking care of our sick and svoun- 

 ded at Talavera? Why, also, had 

 not lord Wellington better inform- 

 ation respecting the defence of 

 the passes ? Why trust to the in- 

 telligence he received from the 

 Spaniards neglecting even the 

 ordinary precaution of sending an 

 officer of his own to ascertain whe- 

 ther the passes were properly de- 

 fended ? His majesty's minister, 

 at the time that they trumpeted 

 forth the battle as a splendid and 

 decisive victory, were in the pos- 

 session of lord Wellington's dis- 

 patches, in which he stated the 

 unfortunate situation of his army, 

 the necessity of retreating, and 

 the difficulties he had to encounter 

 in effecting a retreat. 



The Marquis Wellesley, after 

 expressing his private feelings on 

 the present occasion, when he was 

 called on to perform a public dut)', 

 by vindicating the character and 

 conduct of so near and dear a rela- 

 tion as a brother, begged leave, in 

 the outset, to observe, that the no- 

 ble carl (Grey) did not seem very 

 clearly to understand the objects 

 of lord Wellington's operations. 

 On the arrival of his brother in 

 Portugal, he found that the ene- 

 my was not only in possession of 

 its northern provinces, but that a 

 plan had been concerted, by which 

 Victor and Soult were to advance 

 from different points, into the 

 south. The first object, therefore, 

 was the deliverance of Portugal. 

 The operation by which he ex- 

 pelled Souit was as able, as rapid, 



* Sep Vol. LI ; 1809, History of Europe, p. 176. 



