HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



31 



and conclusivcj as any recorded in 

 the page ol'history. It was tliere- 

 fore unfair, as some noble lords 

 had done, to describe such an ope- 

 ration, merely as an affair with the 

 rear guard of Souk's corps. Af- 

 ter this lord Wellington immedi- 

 ately proceeded to the south, to 

 oppose Victor, who had actually 

 advanced in that direction, but 

 who, on the approach of lord 

 Wellington, had thought it pru- 

 dent to retreat. What was tiie 

 situation of Spain when lord Wel- 

 lington advanced into that coun- 

 try ? The supreme central go- 

 vernment had been long establish- 

 ed, and their authority was gene- 

 rail}' recognized. The part of the 

 country through which his march 

 Jay, abounded in resources of every 

 description, nor was it fair to en- 

 tertain a doubt of the power and 

 disposition of the Spanish govern- 

 ment ■ to render them available. 

 The joint request of the supreme 

 •Junta and general Cuesta to lord 

 Wellington, was, that he would 

 co-operate with the Spanish army 

 in driving VictorbeyondtheTagus. 

 How could lord Wellington have 

 refused his assistance for tiie at- 

 tainment of that limited object ? 

 Would not a refusal on his part 

 have argued a supposition that the 

 Spanish government was incom- 

 petent to perform its duty ? and 

 that the country, though full of 

 provisions, was unwilling to supply 

 them ? Besides, how could he 

 have answered for the safety of 

 Portugal, without striking such a 

 blow against Victor, as might pre- 

 vent him from joining and co-ope- 

 rating with Soult or any French 

 lorps that might invade that king- 

 dom from the northward ? The 

 plan concerted between lord Wel- 



lington and general Cuesta, was 

 briefly this : lord Wellington, sup- 

 ported by general Cuesta, Was 

 to move against Victor's corps. 

 In the mean time Venegas, by a 

 circuitous march, was to threaten 

 Madrid, in order, by this demon- 

 stration to draw off the attention 

 of the French corps, under Sebas- 

 tiani and king Joseph, and pre- 

 vent them from forming a junction 

 with Victor. From this plan, if 

 duly executed, lord Wellington 

 was justified in expecting every 

 success. Accordingly, he advanced 

 against Victor at Talavera, on the 

 22nd of July, and soon came in 

 sight of the enemy, whom he pro- 

 posed to attack on the following 

 morning. Victor's corps was then 

 unsupported by any other, and 

 consisted of no more than 28,000 

 men. If, therefore, the attack 

 upon Victor had been made on the 

 23rd, as proposed by lord Welling- 

 ton, must not the result have been 

 most glorious and complete ? Ge- 

 neral Cuesta, however, refused to 

 attack the enemy on thatdav ; for 

 what reason had not been ex- 

 plained. But the consequence was, 

 that Victor retreated, and made his 

 escape on the very night of the 

 23rd, and effected a junction be- 

 tween Sebastiaui and king Joseph. 

 At the same time general Vene- 

 gas, who ought to have been at 

 Argonda on the 22nd, perplexed 

 with orders, and counter-orders, 

 from the Junta, did not arrive 

 there till the 29th. Against such 

 strange mismanagement what hu- 

 man prudence could provide ? 



Lord Wellesley perfectly agreed 

 with the noble lords on the other 

 side of the House, as to the neces- 

 sity of a radical change in the go- 

 vernment ol Spain ; and his opi- 



