32 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1810. 



nionsonthatheadjheibelievedwere 

 not unknown.* But that change, 

 however, could not be the work 

 of a day. But were we, therefore, 

 to abandon the Spaniards to the 

 mercy of their cruel invaders ? to 

 desert them in the crisis of their 

 fortunes ? As to the battle of Ta- 

 lavera, nothing more could be said 

 of that battle in a military point of 

 view, than that the British troops 

 had succeeded in repulsing the 

 attack of a French army almost 

 double their numbers, the efforts 

 of which had been directed chiefly 

 against the British. And with 

 respect to its consequences, he 

 would boldly maintain, thatthede- 

 feat of the enemy at Talavera had 

 essentially contributed to the main 

 objects of the campaign. For, un- 

 less that blow had been struck 

 against Victor it would have been 

 impossible to prevent the enemy 

 from over-running the south of 

 Spain, or from making a fresh ir- 

 ruption into Portugal. It saved 

 the south of Spain from absolute 

 destruction. It had attbrded time 

 to Portugal to organize her army, 

 and to strengthen her military 

 posts. It also enabled lord Wel- 

 lington to take a position, where 

 he might derive supplies from 

 Spain, at the same time that he 

 drew nearer to his own magazines 

 — upon the whole, he did not he- 

 sitate to say, that his brother was 

 as justly entitled to every distinc- 

 tion that his sovereign had confer- 

 red on him, and to every honour 

 and reward which it was in the 

 power of that House to bestow, 

 as any noble lord, who, for his 

 personal services, had obtained the 



* See various Extract?, from tlie Correspondence of the marquis of Welle&ley. 

 with Mr. C, Secretary of State for Foreign aflhirs. Vol, LI. 1809, History ol 

 Europe. Chap. X., pp. 182— 193. 



same distinctions, or who sat there 

 by descent from his illustrious 

 ancestors. 



Lord Grenville observed, that 

 the propriety of giving the inform- 

 ation relative to the campaign, 

 and especially the calamitous 

 march into Spain required on a 

 former occasion by his friend lord 

 Grey, had been supported by the 

 manner in which his noble friend 

 the marquis of Wellesley, had dis- 

 cussed the subject. He had very 

 properly taken a comprehensive 

 view of the causes and conse- 

 quences of that battle. The events 

 of twenty-four hours might be suf- 

 ficient to prove the merits of the 

 soldier ; but the case of a gene- 

 ral was widely difierent. The 

 present question was, whether a 

 British army ought to have been 

 risked in an enterprise which de- 

 pended so much on Spanish co- 

 operation. This question was 

 none of his seeking; but he must 

 say, that even a victory, if attend- 

 ed with calamitous consequences, 

 did not deserve the thanks of that 

 House. He believed that lord 

 "Wellington was fettered by the 

 nature of the service on which he 

 had been sent, and by his instruc- 

 tions, and that the plan and its 

 calamitous circumstances ought 

 to be attributed to ministers. 



The vote of thanks to lord 

 Wellington was carried without a 

 division. The motions for thanks 

 to the inferior officers and army 

 were carried unanimously. 



Thanks to lord Wellington and 

 the army at Talavera were moved 

 in the 



Houseof Commons, February 1. 



of 



