HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



43 



landed, and other descriptions of 

 force, appropriate to service dif- 

 ferent from that entered on. On 

 the 28th of August it was decided, 

 by our commander, that Antwerp 

 was not assailable, and that our 

 troops must retreat. How was the 

 long interval employed before it 

 was thought advisable to come to 

 that decision? Instead of proceed- 

 ing at once to Antwerp, and leav- 

 ing some part of our shipping to 

 blockade Flushing ; which block- 

 ade would have rendered the force 

 in that garrison and all Walcheren 

 quite useless, Flushing was regu- 

 larly besieged. Thus the force 

 which must have been kept as it 

 were in a cage, was, by our lying 

 down before Flushing, with dou- 

 ble the number, rendered com- 

 pletely effective against us. But 

 this was not all. Before Flushing 

 was reduced, a formidable force 

 , was collected at Antwerp: and the 

 fortress, according to the admira- 

 ble plan, was to be taken by a 

 coup de main, after a month's pre- 

 vious notice! It had been said, 

 that Walcheren had been retained 

 in consequence of a requisition 

 from Austria, in the hope that 

 Buonaparte might thereby be in- 

 fluenced in his negociations with 

 that power. If, however, it was 

 meant to retain Walcheren only as 

 a feint, why proceed to fortify the 

 works of Flushing ? Why con- 

 struct new works elsewhere in 

 Walcheren, and expend a consi- 

 derable sum on such fortifications? 

 That the retention of Walcheren 

 was a feint, no rational man could 

 believe. The fallacy of the pre- 

 tence was obvious from the con- 

 duct of ministers themselves, in 

 being at the expence of fortifying 

 it. But, supposing it to have been 



indeed a feint, it was absurd to 

 imagine that Buonaparte, in order 

 to get possession of that island, 

 or to avoid the delaying for two 

 or three weeks iiis attack upon it, 

 would be induced to lower his 

 tone, or modify or moderate his 

 terms with Austria. 



Lord Porchester having gone 

 through the principal points, as 

 they occurred, and appeared to be 

 to himconnectedwitli thepolicyor 

 progress of this expedition, pro- 

 ceeded to considerthe choice which 

 ministers had thought proper to 

 make of a commander to direct its 

 operations. Although he was much 

 more conversant with the gaieties 

 of London, or the business of of- 

 fice, than with the annals of mili- 

 tary experience or glory, yet he 

 did not complain of the appoint- 

 ment of such an officer to the 

 command of such an expedition. 

 He was, in fact, the most appro- 

 priate person that could have been 

 chosen. Abortive and impracti- 

 cable as the plan was, he should 

 have thought it a pity that the cha- 

 racter of an intelligent and expe- 

 rienced officer should have been 

 exposed to sacrifice, by rendering 

 him responsible for the success of 

 a measure, which it would have 

 been impossible for such a man to 

 comprehend or execute. Such an 

 expedition could, in fact, be un- 

 derstood by ministers alone, and 

 one of themselves alone, was fitted 

 to command it. Many other 

 proofs of neglect and inattention, 

 with regard to the conduct of the 

 expedition, had been mentioned 

 to lord Porchester. Among many 

 others, he had been told that 

 transports, with artificers, and ma- 

 terials for the construction or re- 

 pair of fortificatioDi^, were acta- 



