76 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1810. 



ever way Antwerp was to be 

 apf)roacl)ed or taken, the service 

 was one of very great risk, and 

 in which the safe return of tl)e 

 army so employed might be very 

 precarious, from the opposition 

 made, and the time consumed in 

 the operation, whicli enabled the 

 enemy, in a short time, to assem- 

 ble a great force, from every part 

 of the Netherlands, and Holland, 

 and even from Westphalia, and 

 from the course of the Rhine, as 

 well as from the frontier of France. 

 General Calvert had stated the 

 utter impossibility of laying down 

 any thing in the shnpe of detailed 

 reasoning, without a knowledge of 

 local circumstances, and to what 

 extent those circumstances would 

 admit of a naval co operation. 

 Colonel Gordon had given it as 

 his opinion, so far back as the 

 29th of May, that the first opera- 

 tion necessary, would be to get 

 possession of Cadsand and South 

 Beveland. And yet it was not 

 until the expedition had actually 

 failed, that it had occurred to his 

 majesty's ministers, to consider of 

 the necessity of taking possession 

 of these places, or of hinting at 

 it, in the instructions given to the 

 officers entrusted with the exe- 

 cution of this project. The 

 inference, with which colo- 

 nel Gordon concluded his ob- 

 servations was, " thai this attempt 

 would be a most desperate enter- 

 prise, cannot be doubted ; and 

 that in the attempt, whether suc- 

 cessful or otherwise, a very large 

 portion of our nav}' would be put 

 to imminent hazard." 



The next opinion taken by the 

 commander-in chief, was that of 

 general Brownrigg, whose opinion 

 respecting the ulterior and main 



object of the expedition, the de- 

 struction of the arsenals at Ant- 

 werp, was, " That a force passing 

 over from Walcheren to South 

 Beveland, would take possession 

 of Landvliet, on the main land ; 

 and the distance from thence to 

 Antwerp being only six leagues, 

 might succeed in taking the latter 

 place by a coup de main." Of all 

 the plans proposed, lord Por- 

 chester considered this as by far 

 the most extravagant and imprac- 

 ticable. The next opinion taken 

 was that of general Hope, who 

 was of opinion, that an attempt to 

 take Antwerp by a coup de main, 

 in the only way v^-hich was at all 

 practicable, would be " attended 

 with great risk to the force cm- 

 ployed, without, perhaps, any 

 adequate security for the attain- 

 ment of its object." 



Here then were five military 

 opinions, four of them decidedly 

 adverse, and the fifth not favour- 

 able to the expedition. His ma- 

 jesty's government next applied to 

 two naval officers, sir Home Pop- 

 ham and sir Richard Strachan. 

 Sir Home I'opham, in his memo- 

 randa, particularly pressed two 

 points, namely, •' That the troops 

 should be embarked in ships of 

 war, as trans])ortswere a great im- 

 pediment topromplitudeinattack, 

 and that, as the season was ad- 

 vancing, the expedition should be 

 ready to sail by the 2Gth or 27ih 

 of .June, about the time of the 

 full moon." The ships of war were 

 not to proceed up the Scheldt, and 

 the hopes of promptitude were I 

 enlivened b}' the vast nim>ber of 

 horses sent out, as well as by not 

 dispatching the expedition, which 

 ought to have sailed on the 27'h 

 of June, till the 27th of July. Sir 



