HISTORY OF E I R P E. 



Richard Strachan assured the 

 noble lord at the head of the admi- 

 rahy, that he entenaioed but very 

 little hope of ultimate success at 

 Antwerp. Nothing was commu- 

 nicated to him on the subject of 

 the difficulties of going up to Ant- 

 werp : but he remembereil, that 

 when he remarked, that all he 

 thought could be done, would be 

 the reduction of Walcheren, lord 

 Mulgrave replied, that the coun- 

 try would be little satisfied with 

 doing nothing more with such an 

 armament than taking Walcheren. 

 Upon the repetition of his fears, 

 the noble lord assured him that he 

 had the fullest confidence of suc- 

 cess; and tiiat he had reason to 

 think they should do very well. — 

 As to the plan of the expedition, 

 lord Porchester confessed that, 

 with all his anxiety and industry 

 to obtain information, lie had not 

 been able to learn what was the 

 nature of the arrangement propos- 

 ed. His own conviction was, that 

 there were as many plans, as de- 

 partments, engaged in the expedi- 

 tion. Lord Castlereagh's plan, if 

 one might guess from the outline, 

 was to make a dash, which dis- 

 dained to stop at even the most 

 desperate risks and appalling dan- 

 gers. The plan of the admiralty, 

 at least that fixed on at the sailinjr, 

 was much more prudent, as it did 

 not hazard the navy in a most in- 

 tricate navigation. The ch.incel- 

 lor of the Exchequer's whole at- 

 tention was absorbed in calculating 

 on that arrangement which should 

 convey the expedition with the 

 least possible quantity of dollars. 

 To what plan the secretary for 

 foreign attairs (Mr. Canning) 

 was more particularly attached, he 

 could Dot tell. But it was prob- 



able that he, too, just at that 

 time, iiad some little plan of his 

 own, which he did not communi- 

 cate to his colleagues. The admi- 

 ral appeared to have a plan ; but 

 the commander-in-chief appeared 

 to have had no plan. From 

 the whole of his examination it 

 was clear that he had not, at any 

 time during the campaign, consi- 

 dered of any plan at all. Neither 

 was tliere any pointed out to him 

 in the instructions of government. 

 It was difficult, therefore, lord P. 

 declared, for him to settle what 

 plan he should proceed to discuss; 

 but he should, at all events, en- 

 deavour to follow up what seemed 

 to have been the intention of the 

 government. The general under- 

 standing, he said, of the business 

 seemed to be, that part of the 

 army was, in the first place, to 

 take possession of the island of 

 Walcheren, and another corps to 

 take Ciidsand : the main body was 

 to advance to Landvliet. This 

 was so far the apparent plan, 

 which, however, in some of the 

 documents before the House, was 

 said, in not very intelligible lan- 

 guage, to relate to a " second, 

 ulterior, simultaneous, and subse- 

 quent operation," But this ulte- 

 rior, simultaneous, and subsequent 

 operation was given up, because 

 the commander-in-chief appre- 

 hended that, before he could pro- 

 ceed in it, he should have to un- 

 dertake, perhaps, two or three 

 preliminary sieges. Lord Por- 

 chester proceeded to point out, 

 and comment on, those parts of 

 theevidencebeforethe House, that 

 bore most directly on the present 

 question, and from all the data that 

 formed the foundation of the expe- 

 dition against Antwerp, contended 



