HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



161 



In our last volume it was no- 

 ticed, that, according to the plan 

 concerted between sir ArthurWel- 

 lesley for attacking the French 

 general, Venegas was to advance 

 to Arganda.* 



In reviewing the conduct of the 

 Supreme Junta, we have here an 

 opportunity of mentioning a cir- 

 cumstance in our narrative of the 

 campaign of 1809, inadvertently 

 omitted, which, while it bears di- 

 rectly and very strongly on the 

 character of the Junta, is due to 

 that of sir Arthur Wellesley. 



Sir Arthur proposed to attack 

 Victor on the 23rd of July, when 

 he had but 28,000 men. Soult, 

 Ney, and Mortier, were at the 

 distance of 150 miles from him. 

 The allied armies had 58,000 men, 

 to oppose to the 28,000 under ge- 

 neral Victor. What from the un- 

 accountable conduct of general 

 Cuesta, and what from the con- 

 duct, as yet unaccounted for, of 

 the Junta, in countermanding the 

 orders to gen. Venegas, who was 

 to be at Arganda on the 23rd of 

 July, lord Wellington and his 

 army, victorious at Talavera, were 

 compelled to retreat, f 



It is scarcely possible to account 

 for all that passed in the Junta 

 otherwise than on the supposition 

 that there were traitors among 

 them. Some of the members, 

 when the Junta was likely to 

 come to any resolution that they 

 deemed hostile to the interests of 

 the usurpers, were in the habit of 

 running out of the hall, crying 



Treason ! By this means they 

 overawed the raembfTS faithful to 

 their country. 



The Junta was extremely re- 

 luctant to quit the possession of 

 power. The possession of this 

 they seemed to prefer to every 

 consideration. In their arrange- 

 ments for the convocation of the 

 Cortes, demanded by the whole 

 Spanish nation, they proceeded 

 with studied procrastination. At 

 length it was fixed for March, 

 1810. The proclamation for as- 

 sembling the Cortes was brought 

 about by Jovellanos, Calvo, and 

 other members of high rank, 

 against the influence of a number 

 of lawyers who had crept into the 

 Junta. The Junta became at last 

 objects not only of hatred and 

 aversion, but derision : they were 

 afraid, on account of the indigna- 

 tion of the people, to appear in 

 day-time in the streets of Cadiz. 

 The letter of marshal Soult, con- 

 veying intelligence to Paris, is 

 dated the 22nd of January ; yet no 

 communication on the subject was 

 made to the governor of Cadiz till 

 the 26th ; and then it was trans- 

 mitted not by the Central Junta, 

 but through an irregular channel ; 

 and as if by accident. Marshal 

 Soult, in the letter to Berlhier, 

 above quoted, Cordova, Jan. 27, 

 says he had been informed, that 

 the Junta had retreated to Cadiz 

 only for the purpose of being in a 

 situation to treat and capitulate.^ 

 The information does not appear 

 to have been altogether incorrect. 



• See Vol. LI. Hist. Eur. p. 183. 



t Speech of the marquis of Wellesley in the House of Lords, June 8, 1810. 



J Soult, in a letter to Berthier, Seville, Feb. 2, obser\-es, as a circumstance cor- 

 roborative of the hope that Cadiz would not make any resistance, that Venegas, the 

 favourite and confidential general of the Junta, commanded there. But Venegas 

 doe* not appear to have deserved this confidence. 



Vol. III. M 



