HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



201 



The inhabitants of Lisbon, par- 

 ticularly those of the higher ranks, 

 received the emigrants from the 

 provinces with open arms, and 

 contributed in every possible way 

 to their relief. People of all ranks, 

 and even characters, were united 

 in a common sympathy with their 

 suffering compatriots. Persons but 

 little suspected of possessing ten- 

 der or generous feelings, shewed 

 both compassion and bounty on 

 the present melancholy occasion. 

 A very powerful sympathy with 

 the suffering Portuguese, was also 

 expressed by the British legisla- 

 ture and nation. The House of 

 Commons voted for their relief 

 100,000^. ; and a sum at least 

 equal to this, was raised by volun- 

 tary subscription. And this mo- 

 ney was very judiciously employed 

 in the purchase and freightage of 

 such things in this country as the 

 Portuguese were in most imme- 

 diate want of. 



Among the military maxims of 

 Buonaparte, the principal are, to 

 bring matters as soon as possible 

 to a decisive engagement, to bear 

 impetuously with superior masses 

 on the main strength of the ene- 

 my, and, if he cannot surround 

 him, to separate his wings, by cut- 

 tingthroughhiscentre ; but, above 

 all, to surprize him, by dashing 

 forwards to the points of place and 

 time most favourable for action, 

 , without waiting for the formation 

 of magazines, or encumbering his 

 army with superfluous baggage : 

 - nay, and without always waiting 



for the reduction of fortified places 

 lying in the route of his progress. 

 And the advantage of this system 

 of warfare had been proved by the 

 conquest of Milan, in 1796; the 

 victory of Austerlitz, in 1805 ; 

 that of Jena, in 1807 ; and of Ra- 

 tisbon,in 1809. The British army 

 of Portugal, first under the con- 

 duct of sir John Moore, and next 

 under that of lord Wellington, 

 obliged him to respect, in some 

 measure, the old and common sys- 

 tem. He proceeded at first, in 

 the campaign of 1810, with cau- 

 tion ; but after the reduction of 

 Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 

 Massena, acting no doubt accord- 

 ing to the outlines of a plan laid 

 down by his master, did not hesi- 

 tate to advance with the utmost 

 celerity, and without magazines, 

 through the province of Beira to 

 the banks of the Tagus, in Estre- 

 madura. He trusted that he should 

 find provisions and stores ready to 

 his hand in Portugal, as he had 

 done in Italy and Germany. And 

 from the character he was natu- 

 rally induced to form of lord Wel- 

 lington, full of ardour, and eager 

 to engage in some instances to all 

 appearances unnecessarily, if not 

 rashly, he could not well imagine 

 that he would oppose to the 

 French the Fabian, or defensive 

 system of warfare. That he did 

 not, in fact, think this a line of 

 conduct to be expected on the part 

 of the English general, he avows 

 in his journal, the Moniteur, of 

 the 29th and 30th of Nov. 1810.* 



• *' Lcs obstacles que I'armec de Portugal a rencontre viennent d'une systeme 

 inactif defense profondement combine, et qui a ete execute avec une barbarie unique 

 et inconnu dans nos guerres Europ^ennes (alluding to lord Wellesley's former com- 

 mand in India) pour I'honneur des «tats et de I'humanite." Buonaparte, in all his 

 •Utementfi, is extremely anxious to find faults in the conduct of the generals opposed 



