202 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1810. 



It is of the utmost importance, 

 in war, to penetrate into the cha- 

 racter and leading maxims of the 

 adversary. In the present instance 

 lord Welh'ngton understood Buo- 

 naparte better than Buonapartedid 

 lord Wellington. It seems to 

 have been expected by Massena, 

 that the allied army would have 

 been brought to a general action 

 before Ciudad Rodrigo, or Al- 

 meida. And in the French jour- 

 nals it is held out as a reproach to 

 that general, that he did not come 

 to the relief of either of these 

 cities. But it was no part of his 

 plan to risk or weaken his army 

 by such bold attempts ; which, if 

 they had succeeded, would not 

 have decided the campaign ; and 

 which, if they had failed, might 

 have been most disastrous, and 

 even ruinous. 



The object of l(/rd Wellington 

 in this campaign was, to defend 

 Portugal, and at the same time to 

 occupy a considerable French 

 force, which would otherwise have 

 been employed in other parts of 

 Spain, to thesubjugation, perhaps, 

 of the whole of the peninsula. On 

 account of his inferiority of num- 

 bers, and the raw, undisciplined 

 state of the Portuguese troops, he 

 wisely acted on the defensive. By 

 this system of protracted warfare 

 the Portuguese troops were accus- 

 tomed to military evolutions and 

 the use of arms, and to the smell 

 and noise of gunpowder. They 



were first brought seriously into 

 action, in an advantageous posi- 

 tion, on the steep heights of Bu- 

 zaco. The courage and firmness 

 displayed in the battle of Buzaco, 

 while they contributed materially 

 to the diminution of the French 

 force, augmented the confidence 

 of the allied army. When he 

 found the position of Buzaco no 

 longer tenable, he retreated before 

 the enemy without making any 

 serious demonstration of resist- 

 ance, till he came nearer to Lis- 

 bon, t,o his resources of both rein- 

 forcements and supplies ; to posi- 

 tions which he had examined be- 

 forehand, which he had fortified 

 with the greatest care, and which 

 were so strong, both by nature and 

 art, that he thought himself au- 

 thorized there to abide the united 

 efforts of the enemy, and to fight 

 for the ulterior deliverance of Por- 

 tugal. By the waste and desola- 

 tion of the country, the French, 

 who had no magazines, and who 

 were incessantly harassed in their 

 rear by the Portuguese militia, 

 must be reduced to greatstraits for 

 want of provisions. The farther, 

 therefore, they could be drawn into 

 the country the better ; and the 

 greater would be the advantages 

 possessed by the British general, 

 near Lisbon, in carrying on his 

 subsequent operations. 



The French army entered Coim- 

 bra on the first of October, the 

 day on which the main body of the 



to him. While, therefore, he is forced to acknowledge that the plan on which 

 Lord Wellington acted, was profoundly combined, be says in the same breath, that 

 it was executed with singular and unheard of barbarity. To have admitted, that he 

 was outdone in the art of war by his adversary, was not to be thought of — No. It 

 was impossible. B-ithe was led into an error by the credit he gave Lord Wellington 

 for a degree of humanity, which, as afterwards appeared, he did not possess. Mefi 

 are apt to judge of otliei-s by themselves ; but this, as was^xperieoced by Buona- 

 parte, is ^metimes a source of deception. 



