HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



203 



allies left it. A shew of resistance 

 was made by the British cavalry, 

 that had been left for aiding the 

 retreat of the inhabitants. Mas- 

 sena, on the second, sent forward 

 his advanced guard to Condeixa, 

 from which the allies retreated, 

 and his cavalry to seize and com- 

 mand all the roads terminating in 

 the great highway to Lisbon. He 

 did not find the supplies expected 

 at Coimbra. Provisions of every 

 kind had been carried away or de- 

 stroyed. His army, we find him 

 stating to Berthier, subsisted on 

 Indian corn, and what leguminous 

 deeds were to be found in the fields 

 and gardens. He set out from 

 Almeida with only thirteen days 

 provisions. He found some at 

 Vizeu : but even before he reach- 

 ed Coimbra, the army had no- 

 thing to subsist on but Indian corn, 

 which, the mills being all de- 

 stroyed, the men carried, instead 

 6f biscuit, in their knapsacks. 

 His sick and wounded he left in 

 two entrenched convents at Coim- 

 bra, with a guard of only 3500 

 men. He could not spare a greater 

 number. <' The best guard," he 

 said, " was to beat the English, 

 and drive them to their ships." 

 Not doubting, indeed, but the 

 English were in full flight to their 

 ships atLisbon already; though he 

 had no magazines, and though 

 20,000 Portuguese militia were in 

 his rear, he set out from Coimbra 

 with the whole of his forces, and 

 followed as hard as possible on the 

 heels of the allies, between whose 

 fear-guard and the French cavalry 

 there was daily skirmishing. It 

 was not till the 14th of October, 

 When he reconnoitred the English 

 ftmificattons in person, that he 

 digcovered his mistake, and the 



dangerous predicament into which 

 he had been led by the military 

 genius of lord Wellington, 



The grand position of the allied 

 army was a line of strongly forti- 

 fied heights, extending from AU 

 handra, on the Tagus, to Torres 

 Vedras, about thirty miles from 

 Lisbon, and from thence to the 

 mouth of the Sissandro. And be- 

 hind these, two other lines of 

 trenches and redoubts, extending 

 from Ericeyra and Mafra, on the 

 sea, to the Tagus. One of these 

 which was next to the fortified 

 line of Torres Vedras, might be 

 defended by 20,000 men ; the 

 other, which was nearer Lisbon, by 

 half that number. On these was 

 planted an immense power of 

 heavy artillery. But besides this 

 triple line, redoubts were raised 

 at Penniche, Obidos, and other 

 places. Many of the hills were 

 fortified. On the left of the posi- 

 tion, the whole of the coast, from 

 Vimeira to the mouth of the Ta- 

 gus, was studded with redoubts, 

 mounted with heavy artillery. On 

 the right, the banks of the Tagus 

 were flanked by our armed boats. 

 Mines also, ready to spring, were 

 formed in various places. In 

 short, the whole country, from 

 Lisbon almost to the Mondego, 

 appeared like one fortification in 

 the form of a crescent. Within 

 the lines of Torres Vedras, Eri- 

 ceyra, and Mofra, defended by 

 from 70, to 80,000fight'ng men, the 

 allies had collected all the produce 

 of the country through which 

 they had retreated. With Lisbon 

 in their rear, they were abundantly 

 supplied with every thing they 

 wanted. 



The French troops, both for 

 subsistence and protection from 



