434 ANNUAL REGISTER, ISIO. 



final result of the expedition to tlie 

 Scheldt. 1st. The ground upon 

 which, after the army was at length 

 assembled near Batz, a landing in 

 prosecution of the ulterior objects 

 of the expedition was not deemed 

 advisable : 2ndly. Why that army 

 was not sooner there assembled, in 

 readiness to commence further ope- 

 rations.— With respect to the for- 

 mer position I am inclined to think 

 that it is so clear and evident, that 

 no further operations could at that 

 time, and in the then sickly state of 

 the army, have been undertaken 

 with any prospect of success ; that 

 it would be unnecessarily trespas- 

 sing on your majesty to enter into 

 much more detail on this point 

 than has been already brought be- 

 fore your majesty, in my dispatch 

 of the 29th of August'; and the 

 chief object of this paper will be 

 directed to show to your majesty, 

 that the second point, namely, Why 

 the army was not brought up sooner 

 to the destination from whence its 

 ulterior objects wereto commence, 

 is purely a naval consideration, 

 and that the delay did in no 

 shape rest with me, or depend 

 upon any arrangements in which 

 the army was concerned ; every 

 facility, on the contrar}', having 

 been afforded by their movements 

 to the speedy progress of the ar- 

 mament. — In the first place, it is to 

 be remarked, that the occupation 

 of Walcheren, \^hich by some per- 

 sons it had been thought possible 

 to leave behind us, and the reduc- 

 tion of Flushing, which it had once 

 been proposed only to mask, were 

 deemed indispensable to the secu- 

 rity of the fleet, in case of disas- 

 ter ; and accordingly a consider- 

 able separate force was allotted 

 to this service ; and, in this view, 



it was besides distinctly agreed 

 upon, that a vigorous attack by 

 the navy upon the sea front should 

 be made at the same time that the 

 troops, after effecting their land- 

 ing, advanced to invest Flushing ; 

 it being hoped that by a powerful 

 co-operation from the sea, at the 

 moment the troopspresented them- 

 selves before the place, the labour 

 and delay of a regular siege might 

 have been avoided, and a consi- 

 derable proportion of the force al- 

 lotted to this service set at liberty 

 to follow the army up the Scheldt. 

 How far this expectation was ful- 

 filled, or whetiier the assurance 

 given that the whole of the arma- 

 ment (the part to be landed at 

 Walcheren excepted) should be at 

 once transported up the Scheldt, 

 in prosecution of the ultimate ob- 

 jectsof the expedition, was carried 

 into effect, or was wholly disap- 

 pointed, the information already 

 before your majesty will have in a 

 great measure shown, and which 

 it will be my duty to bring more 

 particularly to yourmajesty's view, 

 when I detail the subsequent 

 course of our proceedings. — From 

 what cause this failure ensued, 

 whether it arose from insufficient 

 arrangements on the part of the 

 admiral, or was the unavoidable 

 result of difficulties inherent in the 

 nature of the expedition itself, it 

 is not for me, considering it en- 

 tirely as a naval question, to pre- 

 sume to offer any opinion upon to 

 your majesty. — Before, however, 

 I pursue further the details of the 

 proceedings of the army, govern- 

 ed as they necessarily were (until 

 a footing should be gained on the 

 continent) by the movements of 

 the navy, 1 must for a moment re- 

 fer to two separate operations ; 



