STATE PAPERS. 



437 



will see, that notwithstanding 

 every effort on my part with the 

 admiral, the armament was not 

 assembled at the point of its des- 

 tination till the twenty-fifth, and 

 of course that the means of com- 

 mencing operations sooner against 

 Antwerp were never in my power. 

 It now became at this advanced 

 period my duty to consider very 

 seriously the expediency of landing 

 the army on the continent. On 

 comparing all the intelligence ob- 

 tained as to the strength of the 

 enemy, it appeared to be such as 

 to leave (as slated in my dispatch 

 of the twenty-ninth of August) no 

 reasonable prospect of success to 

 theforceunder m} command,after 

 accomplishing the preliminary 

 operations of reducing Fort Lillo 

 as well as Liefken&hoek, on the op- 

 posite side of Antwerp, without the 

 possession of which the destruction 

 of the 3hips and arsenals of the 

 enemy c uid not be effected, and 

 in addition to this, the sickness 

 which had begun to attack the 

 army about the twentieth, and 

 which was hourlj' increasing to an 

 alarming extent, created the most 

 serious apprehensions in theminds 

 of the medical men, as to its fur- 

 ther progress, at that unhealihy 

 season, and which fatal experience 

 has since shown to have been too 

 well founded. Your majesty will 

 not be surprized if, under these 

 circumstances, I paused in requir- 

 ing the admiral to put the army on 

 shore. That a landing might have 

 been made, and that any force 

 which had been opposed to us in 

 the field would have yielded to the 

 superior valour of British troops, 

 I have no doubt : but then, any 

 such success couldhave been of no 

 avail towards the attainment of the 

 ultimate object; and there was still 



less chance that the enemy would 

 have given us the opportunity. 

 Secure in his fortress, he had a 

 surer game to play ; for if ever the 

 army, divided as it must necessa- 

 rily have been in order to occupy 

 both banks of the river, exposed 

 to the effect of inundation on every 

 side, and with all its communica- 

 tions liable to be cut off, while the 

 force of the enemy was^daily and 

 hourly increasing, had once sat 

 down before Antwerp, it is unne- 

 cessary for me to point out to your 

 majesty how critical must in a 

 short time have been their situa- 

 tion. But when, added to this, 

 sickness to an alarmingextent had 

 begun to spread itscif among the 

 troops, and the certain and fatal 

 progress of which, at that season, 

 was but too well ascertained, it 

 appeared to me that all turlher 

 advance could only tend to com- 

 mit irretrievably the safety of the 

 army which your majesty had con- 

 fided to me, and which every 

 principle of military duty, as well 

 as the direct tenour of my instruc- 

 tions, alike forbade. 



2. Sir Richard Strachari's reply to 

 Earl Chatham's statement, 



Contains many pointed observa- 

 tions, general charges of inaccii- 

 racy, and a refutation of the insi- 

 nuations both against the gallant 

 admiral and the navy, contained in 

 hislordship'sstatement. After the 

 first point to which his Majesty's 

 attention was called, namely, "that 

 after the army was assembled near 

 Batz, a landing in prosecution of 

 the ulterior objects of the expedi- 

 tion was not deemed adviseable,'' 

 Sir Richard declines making any 

 remark, because the reasons which 



