APPENDIX TO CHRONICLE. 
her, and turned her guns with 
ood effect upon the remaining 
our. 
During this time Capt. Mon- 
tressor’s division was making 
every possible exertion to close 
with the enemy, and with the 
assistance of the other boats, 
then joined by Captain Roberts, 
in about five minutes we had 
possession of the whole of the 
flotilla. 
I have to lament the loss of 
many of my brave and gallant 
companions, who gloriously fell 
in this attack; but considering 
the great strength of the enemy’s 
vessels (whose force is under- 
neath described) and their state 
of preparation, we have by no 
means suffered so severely as 
might have been expected. 
[ The letter concludes with ex- 
pressions of acknowledgment to 
several officers. ] 
(Signed Nicu. Lockyer, 
Captain. 
Sir Alexander Cochrane, 
&c. &c. &e. © 
A return of the seamen and ma- 
rines killed and wounded in 
the boats of his Majesty’s ships 
at the capture of the Ame- 
rican gun-vessels, near New 
Orleans. 
Total—3 midshipmen, 13 sea- 
men, I private marine, killed; 
1 Captain, 4 lieutenants, 1 lieu- 
tenant of marines, $3 masters’ 
mates, 7 midshipmen, 50 sea- 
men, 11 marines, wounded.— 
Grand total—17 killed; 77 
wounded, 
Armide, off Isle au Chat, 
Jan. 18, 1815. 
Sir,—An unsuccessful attempt 
to gain possession of the enemy’s 
155 
lines near New Orleans on the 8th 
instant, having left me to deplore 
the fall of Major-General the Ho- 
nourable Sir Edward Pakenham, 
and Major-General Gibbs; and 
deprived the service of the pre- 
sent assistance of Major-General 
Keane, who is severely wounded ; 
I send the Plantagenet to England 
to convey a dispatch from Major- 
General Lambert, upon whom 
the command of the army has de- 
volved, and to inform my Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty 
of the operations of the combin- 
ed forces since my arrival upon 
this coast. 
The accompanying letters, Nos. 
163 and 169, of the 7th and 16th 
ult. will acquaint their lordships 
with the proceedings of the squa- 
dron to the 15th of December. 
The great distance from the 
anchorage of the frigates and 
troop ships to the Bayone Catalan, 
which from the best informa- 
tion we could gain appeared to 
offer the most secure, and was 
indeed the only unprotected spot 
whereat to effect a disembarka- 
tion, and our means, even with 
the addition of the captured ene- 
my’s gun-vessels, only affording 
us transport for half the army, 
exclusive of the supplies that were 
eg it became necessary, in 
order to have support for the divi- 
sion that would first Jand, to as- 
semble the whole at some inter- 
mediate position, from whence 
the second division could be re- 
embarked in vessels draught 
light into the Lake, as near the 
Bayone as might be practicable, 
and remain there until the boats 
could land the first division and 
return. 
Upon the 16th, therefore, the 
