256: 
tion’ on’a particular subject,” al- 
luding. apparently to the “ brief 
statement” of March 10 ;—his, 
stating that when his nephew 
wrote to him next ‘he would 
(though he sat up beyond mid- 
night) express at some length his 
sincere and warm gratitude for 
his most affectionate and obliging 
letter,of April last, and touch on 
points to which there was then 
no time to advert ;’—and his stat- 
ing in a letter of 13th of March, 
1813, “« Next week I shall send 
you, a brief statement of my do- 
mestic arrangements, and plans 
which I have not time to trans- 
cribe this afternoon. It will be 
in long hand, for on such a sub- 
ject I wish for no reserve.” The 
rest of the letters contained the 
strongest and most affectionate 
expressions of regard for his 
brother and family, and pious 
wishes for their prosperity. It also 
appeared that the deceased’s will 
never was in the possession of 
any other person than himself ; 
that Miss Price was the only per- 
son who had access to his papers ; 
and that.a book, containing in- 
structions for making wills, was 
found open on the writing table 
in his study, where it had been 
lying from the 16th of June, un- 
til after, his death. 
It. was contended, in opposition 
tothe will, that from its never 
having been traced out of the 
deceased’s possession ; the legal 
presumption was, that he had.de- 
stroyed. it animo revocandi; that 
it was, therefore, incumbent upon 
the parties setting up. the copy of 
it in question, to. repel this pre- 
sumption. by evidence, that the 
deceased meant the copy to ope- 
rate, but that.the ,circumstances 
ANNUAL ‘REGISTER, 1815. 
of the case did not establish that. 
fact sufficiently to conflict with 
the legal presumption of its re- 
vocation. : : 
. Sir Joun Nicuotr recapitulat- 
ed the leading circumstances of 
the case, and the terms of the pa- 
per propounded, and coincided 
with the counsel for the next of 
kin, that it was for the parties set- 
ting up the paper to repel by evi- 
dence the legal presumption of 
its revocation. The species of evi- 
dence for this purpose need not be 
positive, as, for instance, if it 
had been subsequently destroyed 
by an act of fraudulent spoliation, 
it would be almost impossible that 
they could .prove the. direct af- 
firmative of that fact.. A case of 
circumstances was all that was, 
required ; but then they should be 
such as to leave no doubt on the 
moral conviction of the Court, 
that the deceased meant this pa- 
per to operate. Now the evidence 
out of which these circumstances 
were to arise, must necessarily be 
the conduct of the deceased, his 
declarations of the affection, tes- 
tamentary intentions, &c. If, for, 
instance, it should appear that 
he had made the will under any 
sudden impulse of affection, which 
afterwards abated, the presump- 
tion of his having destroyed it 
animorevocandi would bestrength- 
ened rather than repelled; but if 
he made it from motives which 
had actuated him for years, and 
seemed to cease but with life, and 
that he took precautions for giv- 
ing effect to his purpose, then 
the presumption would rather be 
that he had placed it somewhere 
where it still was in existence, 
than that he had destroyed. it. 
Guided by these principles, : he 
