976 
bound to adopt such construc- 
tions as the rules of law prescrib- 
ed; but the same words would 
receive a different construction 
in the case of charities, from that 
which the law adopted in cases of 
individuals. A casé more strongly 
in point than that of Siderfin’s 
could not be cited. His Lordship 
had formerly seen almost all the 
private papers in that cause, and 
though the testator’s gift was not 
complete, as the note by which 
he intended to specify the objects 
of his bounty was not found, yet 
the Court disposed of his property 
to'a charity, and excluded the 
next of kin. The present case 
resolved itself into this: Did the 
testator, looking at this clause in 
his will, intend to say, “ I mean 
to give to these two charities, and 
such other charities as I shall 
name ;” thereby declaring that 
he gave to charities: or did the 
clause mean this, ‘ Unless I 
name other charities, I mean not 
to give to charities at all?” 
His Lordship had now only to 
say, that with a mind formed to 
sift and doubt, more than was 
consistent with his own comfort, 
he would pay as much attention 
to the case as the human mind 
could devote to any subject ; he 
had a severe and arduous duty to 
perform, and should always feel 
the utmost pain in differing from 
persons on whose authority he 
placed a much greater value than 
on his own. 
The Lord Chancellorafterwards 
gave judgment at great length, 
and with a full explanation of 
the law upon the subject. His 
Lordship stated the eases, in 
which the property of a testator 
feft forsgencral purposes, might 
be carried into effect, according 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 
1815. 
to his views, or modified at the 
discretion of the Court. In the 
present case, there was no doubt 
that the objects were legitimate, 
but they were not definite. There 
were two sources of uncertainty 
and difficulty. In the first place, 
the sums or divisions of the prow 
perty, allotted to the different - 
purposes mentioned by the testa- | 
tor were not fixed; and, in the 
second place, all the objects for 
which it was destined, were not 
specified. Neither of those cir- 
cumstances, however, could affect 
the decision of the Court, in any 
question regarding therights of the 
testator’s next of kin. The will 
here was pointed and definite. It 
designated two objects for the be- 
hoof of which the property of the 
testator was destined—the propa- 
gation of the Gospel in foreign 
parts, and the instruction of mis- 
sionaries. The third was not 
specified, because the testator had 
not, at the time he made it, de- 
termined what it should particu- 
larly be; but he had left no un- 
certainty with régard to its na- 
ture; namely, that it should be 
a charity. This third division of 
the property therefore was left as 
little at the disposal of the next 
of kin, as if it had been actually 
destined for the propagation of 
the Gospel, or any other definite 
end. His Lordship therefore 
gave it as his judgment that the 
third preportion of the legacy 
should neither be absorbed by the 
two specific distinctions mentioned 
in the will, nor revert to the natural 
heirs of the testator, but be de- 
voted to such charitable purposes 
as should be thought proper by 
the Court; and that the master 
should point out such as might 
be beneficial. 
