APPENDIX -TO CHRONICLE. 
able here was, that the legis. 
Jature, when it intended that 
certain marriages should be al- 
together void, had used the very 
words which were not applied 
tothe present case. The 3rd sec- 
tion of the act declared the pub- 
lication of bans, where parents 
gave notice of their dissent, al- 
together void. The 8th annulled 
all marriages celebrated in any 
place but a church or public 
chapel, where bans of marriage 
have been usually published (ex- 
cept by special license) : and the 
llth declared the marriages of 
minors null and void. But the 
present case did not come within 
the range of either of these enact- 
ments. This was still more ma- 
nifest, for by the 1st section mar- 
riages hy bans wereto be celebrat- 
ed in the parish church of the 
parties; and by the 4th, those 
by license in the place where 
the parties resided. But all this 
was directory only. The 8th 
section was still necessary to ren- 
Ger the marriage void, and that 
section did not apply to the pre- 
sent case. By former statutes 
6 and 7 Wm. c. 6. many direc- 
tions were given as to the mode 
of celebrating marriages, and 
penalties imposed upon the par- 
ties not complying with them, 
but the marriages themselves still 
continued valid. The present act 
seemed to proceed upon the same 
principle, and, therefore, the 
marriage in question, though 
perhaps in some degree irregu- 
Jar, vet not being declared null, 
was still to be considered as 
valid, as it would have been 
had the act never passed. Upon 
these grounds, it was submitted 
that the libel must be rejected 
28 
as insufficient, though proved to 
sustain the suit, and the party 
be dismissed. 
It was contended in support 
of the admissibility of the libel, 
that the act, besides being direct- 
tory, was prohibitory: it direct- 
ed where a marriage should be 
had, and prohibited where it 
should not, and this prohibition 
would be without effect unless 
the marriage were null and void. 
The sections were in different 
forms, and it was not necessary 
that all of them should contain 
the words ‘null and void,’’ as 
they would, in construction, fol- 
low to all the clauses after the 
first without being so specified. 
There were various causes of nul- 
lity, which, though not speci- 
fied, would equally render a mar- 
riage void, such as the omission of 
any material parts of the mar- 
riage ceremony, &c. The first part 
of the Ist clause was not so 
strong as the latter, which ex- 
pressly directed that the mar- 
riage should be solemnized in 
the church or chapel where the 
bans had been published, and in 
no other place whatever ; where- 
as the 10th section declared that 
as to bans published, it was not 
necessary to prove a residence, so 
that the parties in this case were 
“perfectly at liberty to have the 
bans published in another church, 
whilst their own was under repair, 
but not afterwards to marry in any 
other than that where the publi- 
cation had passed. Upon these 
grounds it appeared that the mar- 
riage was contrary to the direc- 
tions, and within the prohibitions 
of the act, and, therefore, under 
the proper and legal interpretation 
of that act, null and void. 
