STATE PAPERS OMITTED. 
nise his Most Christian Majesty 
as King of France, and conse- 
quently to recognise the rights 
which belonged to him in that 
capacity; they have not for an 
instant ceased to be with him in 
‘relations of peace and amity, 
which alone conveyed with it the 
engagement to respect his rights ; 
they took upon them this engage- 
ment in a formal though implied 
manner inthe declaration of the 
13th of March, and in the Treaty 
of the 25th. They rendered it 
more strict by making the King 
enter, by his accession to that 
treaty, into their alliance against 
the common enemy ; for if you 
cannot make conquests from a 
friend, you can still less do it 
from an ally. And let it not be 
said, that the King could not be 
the ally of the powers, but by 
co-operating with them, and that 
he did not do so; if the total de- 
fection of the army, which, at 
the time of the treaty of the 25th 
of March, was already known 
and deemed inevitable, did not 
permit him to bring regular troops 
into action, the Frenchmen, who, 
by taking up arms for him to the 
number of 60 or 70,000, in the 
departments of the West and the 
South, those who, shewing them- 
selves disposed to take them up, 
placed the Usurper under the ne- 
cessity of dividing his forces, 
and those who, after the defeat 
of Waterloo, instead of the re- 
sources in men and money which 
he demanded, left him no other 
but that of abandoning every 
thing, were, for the AlliedPowers, 
a real co-operation, who, in pro- 
portion as their forces advanced 
into the French provinces, re- 
established there the King’s au- 
607 
thority, a measure which would 
have caused conquest to cease 
had these provinces been really 
conquered. It is evident, then, 
that the demand which is made of 
territorial cessions cannot be 
founded upon conquest. 
Neither can it have as adequate 
reason the expenditure made by 
the Allied Powers ; for if it be 
just that the sacrifices to which 
they have been forced by a war, 
undertaken for the common good, 
but for the more particular be- 
nefit of France, should not re- 
main chargeable on them, it is 
equally just that they should sa- 
tisfy themselves with an indem- 
nification of the same kind with 
the sacrifices. The Allied Powers, 
however, have made no sacrifice 
of territory. 
We live at a period, when more 
than at any other, it is import- 
ant to strengthen confidence in 
the word of Kings. The exac- 
tion of cessions from his most 
Christian Majesty would produce 
a quite contrary effect, after the 
declaration in which the Powers 
announced, that they took up 
arms only against Buonaparte 
and his adherents; after the 
treaty in which they engaged to 
maintain against all infraction, 
the integrity of the stipulations 
of the 30th of May, 1814,—which 
cannot be maintained unless that 
of France is so; after the procla- 
mations of their Generals in Chief, 
in which the same assurances are 
renewed. 
The exaction of cessions from 
his most Christian Majesty would 
deprive him of the means of ex- 
tinguishing totally and for ever 
among the people that spirit of 
conquest, fanned by the Usurper, 
