APPENDIX TO CHRONICLE. 321 



declared by a covenant. But 

 how would a court of Equity 

 execute it as a trust ? Just as a 

 court of Law would execute it as 

 a covenant. If the court can 

 collect from the deed of trust, 

 that the donor intended the cove- 

 nant to be binding as a trust, this 

 was the whole length it could go. 

 In the case of Coventry which had 

 been quoted, the deed was to be 

 enforced by a covenant. The 

 question was, whether that cir- 

 cumstance prevented the court 

 from looking at the intent of the 

 deed, or did it require the literal 

 fulfilment of it? If it appeared 

 from the intent of this deed, that 

 the donor intended the whole for 

 charitable uses, he would not be 

 bold enough to deny, that a court 

 of Equity might direct the whole 

 to be applied according to the 

 donor's intention. Although 

 when the whole of a property 

 is given to charitable uses, 

 and the revenues increase, that 

 increase must go to the charity; 

 still it does not follow, that 

 because part of a property is 

 so given, all the remainder un- 

 provided for, is to be applied in 

 the same manner. He would 

 now consider the intent of the 

 deed. It is said by the gentle- 

 men on the other side, that in the 

 introductory part of the deed, 

 there is no expression of an inten- 

 tion to benefit the city of Bris- 

 tol. The donor certainly meant 

 a benefit to that city, by allowing 

 it to enjoy the revenue of the 

 property for ten years, while the 

 other cities had it only for one 

 year. The trust deed directed 

 the corporation to purchase lands, 

 of which the rents should amount 

 to 120/. or more; and it appeared 

 Voc. LX. 



to him, that if they could make 

 this purchase for less than 2,000/. 

 they were entitled to appropriate 

 the balance. 



Vice- Chancellor. Certainly 



not, if they were trustees. 



Mr. Bell said, that if he could 

 have succeeded in showing that 

 they were obliged to lay out the 

 whole of the 2,000/., it would have 

 fortified the claim of the corpo- 

 ration; but if he failed in that 

 attempt, the failure would not 

 affect the validity of his other 

 arguments. The deed says, that 

 100/. are to go to the city of 

 Bristol for ten years, and after- 

 wards lOil. to 24: other cities, in 

 annual succession. Now, Mr. 

 Wetherell contends, that since 

 the donor has given them 100/. 

 for ten years, they have no title, 

 in justice, to the residue. Could 

 any thing be more absurd than 

 for a person making a will to say, 

 he left A. B. his property on con- 

 dition that he should pay C. D. 

 50/. per annum, and yet not to 

 intend that all the surplus should 

 go to A. B. Is there a single 

 iota in this deed which says, 

 that if there was a surplus, the 

 corporation should account for 

 it ? Is it not evident that the 

 donor either did not contemplate 

 the rise of rent; or if he did, that 

 he intended the city of Bristol to 

 be benefited by it? If a pro- 

 perty of limited amount is left to 

 a charity, all the benefit resulting 

 from fluctuation of rents, &c. 

 must go to that charity, and not 

 to the heir at law. Of this nature 

 were the cases adduced on the 

 other side; and it was evident 

 they were not applicable, since 

 in this case all the property had 

 not been left to the charity. If 



Y the 



