336 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1818. 



ment, charging the prisoner with 

 having uttered the Bank-note, 

 knowing it to be forged. 



Mr, Sergeant Bosanquet in- 

 formed the jury that he should 

 not offer any evidence against the 

 prisoner in this case. 



Mr. Baron Wood. — No evi- 

 dence being offered, gentlemen, 

 you will of course acquit the 

 prisoner upon this'capital charge. 



The jury found a verdict, 

 Not Guilty, immediately. 



VICE - CHANCELLOR S COURT, 

 SATURDAY, DEC. 19. 



Blenheim Estate. 



The Attorney General, at the 

 relation of the Marquis ofBland- 

 Jbrd and the hon. Agar Ellis, v 

 his Grace the Duke of Marl- 

 borough. — This day the Counsel 

 on both sides having been heard, 



The Vice Chancellor delivered 

 his judgment. He referred to 

 the Acts of Parliament passed in 

 the reign of Queen Anne, for 

 vesting Blenheim-house and its 

 domains in the Duke of Marl- 

 borough, as a mark of gratitude 

 of the country, and a reward for 

 his military achievements. He 

 considered that the limitations in 

 these Acts of Parliament left in 

 the Duke of Marlborough, the 

 absolute ownership of the pro- 

 perty, subject only to the dis- 

 ability of levying fines or recove- 

 ries, with a view to its alienation, 

 or settlement, different from the 

 course adopted by the Legisla- 

 ture. All that had been done 

 by Parliament was for the pur- 

 pose of preventing the possessors 

 of Blenheim-palace from injuring 



or defeating the rights of their 

 successors. It did not lessen a 

 single incident belonging to the 

 rights of the possessor. It left 

 him, as a tenant in tail, in the 

 enjoyment of the common and 

 statute law rights belonging to a 

 tenant in tail, with the exception, 

 that he was not to have the power 

 of levying fines, or recovering, or 

 doing any act tending to alienate 

 the property. The Legislature, 

 therefore, left the then and every 

 subsequent Duke of Marlborough, 

 absolute owner of the timber. It 

 gave him the authority which the 

 law gave to every tenant in tail, 

 in the same manner as if he was 

 the absolute owner in fee-simple. 

 Thus, observed his honour, it 

 would stand if he looked only to 

 the acts of parhament ; but it 

 had been said, that there was 

 some jurisdiction in a court of 

 equity which called on it to inter- 

 fere with the acts of parliament, 

 and to control the legal incidents 

 of property which the common 

 law bestowed on tenants in tail 

 who were deprived of the power 

 of alienation. This seemed to 

 him a very singular proposition. 

 If a tenant in tail had by law a 

 right to enjoy a property with 

 certain incidents, how, he would 

 ask, could a court of equity 

 deprive a tenant in tail of those 

 incidents which belonged to his 

 property ? If the law made the 

 tenant in tail absolute owner of 

 the timber, was it possible to be 

 contended that the judge of a 

 court of equity had a right to 

 make a new law? A court of 

 equity could never affect to en- 

 tertain such a principle — a court 

 of equity could not entertain a 



principle 



