APPENDIX TO CHRONICLE. 337 



principle which would destroy a 

 legal right. It was impossible 

 any principle should exist in a 

 court of equity which entitled 

 the judge to contravene those 

 incidental advantages which the 

 law cast upon a legal ownership 

 of property. It was consequently 

 not upon any such general prin- 

 ciple this Court could be called 

 upon to interfere ; but whatever 

 objection there might be to the 

 power of controlling the incidents 

 of a tenant in tail upon abstract 

 principle, yet, if he found a long 

 course of precedents on the re- 

 cords of the Court, sanctioned by 

 common consent, and the autho- 

 rity of different judges, and that 

 such a jurisdiction had been uni- 

 formly exercised, it would not be 

 his duty to inquire whether the 

 principles upon which such pre- 

 cedents were founded could be 

 sustained. Whatever he might 

 think of such principles, he must 

 be bound by them. It had been 

 pressed upon the Court that 

 there had been a course of pre- 

 cedents which proved that the 

 plaintiffs were entitled to the 

 relief they prayed. The remain- 

 ing part of the duty of the Court 

 was, to examine whether there 

 were such precedents — if there 

 were, he must adopt them, how- 

 ever he might think of them. 

 Had the course of precedents 

 been uninterrupted, whatever 

 might have been his opinion of 

 the usurpation of a court of 

 equity, he should have adhered 

 to them ; for it would be too late 

 for him to attempt to correct the 

 principle on which they were 

 founded ; that was a matter only 

 to be referred to the legislature. 

 The great body of cases consisted 

 Vol. LX. 



of cases respecting tenants for 

 life, without impeachment of 

 waste ; and certainly this Court 

 never would permit a person to 

 whom the original grantor of aa 

 estate had given its temporary 

 possession, the power of injuring, 

 or rendering it less beneficial to 

 those who were to enjoy it after 

 him. The question was, did that 

 furnish any principle that was 

 applicable to the present case ? 

 The question in the present case 

 was not one which called upon 

 the Court to construe the will of 

 a grantor, but it was whether a 

 court of equity could control the 

 principles of the common law, 

 and deprive the Duke of Marl- 

 borough of those legal incidents 

 which, by the common and 

 statute law, he had a right to 

 enjoy. He was decidedly of 

 opinion, therefore, that the pre- 

 cedents referring to tenants for 

 life, had no applicability what- 

 ever to this case. His Honour 

 then adverted at some length to 

 the precedents with reference to 

 the cases respecting the rights of 

 tenants in tail after possibility of 

 issue being extinct, and the cases 

 of ecclesiastical preferments. He 

 should have had great difficulty 

 in supporting the principles of 

 some of the decisions. It ap- 

 peared to him that, notwithstand- 

 ing any of such decisions, his in- 

 terference upon the present oc- 

 casion to restrain the defendant 

 would amount to a legislative act 

 on his part : for, supposing the 

 cases which had been referred to 

 in the course of the arguments 

 at the bar, to have acquired that 

 current of authority which would 

 bind him in that case, it was clear 

 they could have no application 

 Z to 



