On InfinUes. 329 



properties, and are toldtliat it is unlike all but one of them, a 

 positive idea of the subject is then inevitable. It ought to 

 be kept in mind that positive and negative are entirely dis- 

 tinguishable from complete and incomplete, competent and 

 defective. Though in many cases one will involve the oili- 

 er, yet the line of distinction cannot be mistaken. If the 

 fule for positive and negative ideas, deduced from the abovt? 

 remarks, is not the right one, it is obvious that no fixed and 

 general rule can be given; but the subject is left entirely (o 

 the caprice or convenience of the individual who discusses 

 |t. If it is the right one, then we have a positive idea or 

 'deas of a subject, when we know to the least extent any 

 ^u its intrinsic properties; and merely negative ideas, when 

 vve know only that it is diverse from several things specified, 

 and yetj as far as our minds are concerned, subject lo all 

 the boundless variety of real and possible forms and condi- 

 tions which are not specified. It would seem, then, that 

 our idea of infinite space is as positive as it well can be ; for 

 ^ve see with intuitive certainty that it h wholly unlike all 

 other real existences that are possible. BIr, Locke takes 

 Some pains to prove, that infinite space is a real existence. 

 But a writer in a modern, and justly celebrated work, as- 

 serts that God alone is infinite, and that space U a mere 

 nonentity; not having in itself even a finite existence, but 

 possessing the potentiality of admitting exii^tence. He as- 

 serts at the same time, that mind with its affections has no 

 relation to space. To assert that the inevitable perception 

 of extent without limitation, which is present in almost ev- 

 ^ry mind, is solely and entirely the perception of an attri- 

 bute of the Deity, and then virtually to declare that mind 

 IS incapable of stich an attribute, evinces a versatihty and 

 variety in the appHcation of terms, which, however much 

 It may amuse the imagination, and exercise the intellect, 

 communicates a needless obscurity to the style and to the 

 argument. The same writer admits that wherever there h 

 latter there is space; that God can make his works infinite; 

 and yet without proving or even supposing that be has not 

 f^ade them so, he virtually declare, that \t these works are 

 not infinite, infinite space is a mere nonentity, existing 

 only in conception. Notwithstanding the seeming incon- 

 gruity of this language when taken m its usual acceptation, 

 it appears probable enough, that he had the same idea of 



