116 Mr Glover on Forms of Induction. 



essential points, will be detected, than could be credited before 

 hand. In particular, writers on logic ai'e often by no means in 

 accord with those who have described induction not exactly as 

 a form of mental procedure, but by the help of certain signs in 

 nature correctly supposed to correspond with successive steps 

 in the mental operation. Besides, much ill defined language is 

 currently used in speaking of the inductive process, its charac- 

 ter and relations, — thus, it is often said, that physical laws have 

 the power of enabling events to be anticipated by means of 

 others which have been observed ; and this is asserted sometimes 

 when perhaps no very clear ideas are entertained of the charac- 

 ter of this curious property attributed to physical laws. Fur- 

 ther, the categox'y of inductive sciences seems not very accurate- 

 ly defined. Metaphysicians have debated among themselves 

 whether the precepts of the Baconian philosophy are properly 

 applicable to the science of mind, — and whether the investi- 

 gation of mental phenomena can be considered to involve the 

 practice of a method of pi-ocedure at all analogous to the ex- 

 perimental inquiries of physics. And although in the northern 

 part of our island, these questions have been answered in the 

 affirmative, — a response has not been so generally given by the 

 English and Continental metaphysicians. In like manner, wri- 

 ters on the philosophy of medicine differ greatly as to the ex- 

 tent of application admitted in their science to precepts which 

 have been found invariably fertile in results, as applied in pure 

 physics. 



Our object in this essay is to make an effort to reconcile some 

 of the above stated discrepancies, and to clear up (if possible, 

 other portions of the theory of the inductive logic which ap- 

 pear to us in need of elucidation ; and these intentions we pur- 

 pose to effect, by detecting and defining certain forms which 

 induction seems to assume in different sciences, when that pro- 

 cess is regarded not in the mind, but through its corresponding 

 signs in nature,- —and which forms do not appear to be distin- 

 guished as yet in a clear manner by writers ; while, at the same 

 time, we endeavour to show how those varieties came to be, as 

 it were, developed out of the fundamental process which is per- 

 formed in mind, — Avhich does never varv in essential character, 



