Mr Glover on Forms of Induction. l!ii5 



which form the basis of geometrical science. Over such ideas 

 its control is complete ; it developes them into propositions 

 according to the laws of its own constitution. Now, the forma- 

 tion of general notions is one step towards the reduction of 

 physical science to so complete an intellectuality. But the real 

 or essential principles of connexion between properties have not 

 yet been discovered. Could they be known, physics would be- 

 come a demonstrative science. But the mind endeavours to 

 supply their place^ by supposing the existence of such princi- 

 ples as the cause of gravity. And be it noticed, that those 

 ideas of power or force are like the fundamental principles of 

 geometry, ideas of relation which, according to Locke, have 

 their birth in internal sensation or reflection, i. e. in the intel- 

 lect itself. 



It is generally believed that Bacon banished the study of 

 causes from his philosophy. So far is this from being the real 

 state of the case, that, on the contrary, he created a branch of 

 philosophy, the express object of which he makes to be to in- 

 quire into their nature. In fact, while the ancients vainly en- 

 deavoured to arrive at a knowledge of ultimate principles by 

 speculation, and from such principles assigned hypothetically 

 to deduce effects, and thus to demonstrate all the real pheno- 

 mena of nature out of their own unassisted reasoning, as was 

 afterwards attempted by Descartes, Bacon proposed first to 

 investigate the real existing and observable connexions among 

 properties, and not to speculate until this investigation had been 

 carried on as far as possible. He separated the study of causes 

 from the study of observable actions, and assigned the former 

 to metaphysics, and the latter to physics.* And Newton, deep- 



• Since the above made statements may be supposed to involve contro- 

 vertible matter, we shall support them as fully as our limits permit. In the 

 first place, then, it is sometimes not very easy to get at Lord Bacon's mean, 

 ing, even when that ought to be exceedingly clear. This has been remarked 

 by Mr Stewait, who says, " In one passage he approves of the opinion of 

 Plato, that the investigation of foums is the proper object of science, adding, 

 however, that this is not true of the forms which Plato had in view, but of a 

 different set, more suited to the grasp of our faculties." This is nearly the 

 language of the Novum Organon, (Part 1, sect. 2, aph. 51). And elsewhere 

 Bacon declares, tliat he understands by the word Form the law through which 

 the actions of individual bodies are performed (Nov. Org. p. 2, s. 1, aph. 2). 



