126 Mr Glover on Forms oj" Induction. 



ly imbued with the spirit of Bacon's philosopliy, followed its 

 precepts to the letter, when, having arrived at the law of gra- 

 vity inductively, he began to speculate as to the nature of the 

 cause of gravity ; at the same time defining most distinctly in 

 his 28th query, the true aim of philosophy to be the determina- 

 tion of such lofty inquiries as that which regards the cause of 

 gravity. 



Physical inquiry consists in seeking after connexions between 

 properties existing in nature, or in endeavouring to discover 

 where such connexions cannot exist. Hence there are negative 

 and positive laws. But all definitions of laws, by an appropri- 

 ate and slight change in expression can be made to apply to 

 negative as well as to positive cases. Perhaps sufficient has now 

 been said with regard to the results of inductive inquiry, to 

 enable all the varieties of inductive procedure to be understood. 



"We turn, then, to view the objects of contemplation proposed 

 on introducing our subject. And since a law framed by induc- 

 tion should include the class of facts to -which it is applicable, 

 in a perfect manner, every legitimate species of induction must 

 be capable of affording complete proof. But it is evident, that, 

 in such a case as the law of gravity, every individual instance 

 included in the expression cannot be examined, or the labour of 

 proof would be illimitable : how, then, is the requisite degree 

 of evidence in such a case obtained .'' 



Aristotle believed it necessary, for every particular instance 

 subject to a law to be examined, before the expression could be 



Butelsewbere he evidentlj means by forms the most remote principles that we 

 can conceive. Thus, he tells us, that the " foem of any nature is such as, that 

 where it is, the given nature must infallibly be ;" (Nov. Org. p. 1, s. 2, aph. 4). 

 And although, in the very next sentence in which the passage we have just 

 rendered occurs, he seems to allude to something still more essential than a 

 FORM, yet, as iu the inquiry after the form of heat, he concludes heat to be an 

 " expansive bridled motion, struggling in the small particles of bodies ;'' we 

 think that his forms do also correspond with such principles as the cause of 

 gravity, or the cause of light, but that he has another inferior set of forms, 

 such as physical laws. And as he divides his philosophy into the study of 

 forms or metaphysics, and the study of eflfects or actions up to the form which 

 he calls physics, proposing, by^ means of the knowledge acquired in physics, to 

 produce all sorts of mechanical actions, (Nov. Org. p. 2, s. 1, aph. 9), his mean- 

 ing is thought to accord with the interpretation above given. 



